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ABSTRACT
TITLE: Evaluating NAS Delay Impacts from Orbital Launch Operations at Cape
Canaveral and Optimizing Launch Windows.
AUTHOR: Tanner Jordin Furr
MAJOR ADVISOR: John Deaton, Ph.D.
The purpose of this study was to determine if there was an impact of Part
121 arrival delays into Orlando International Airport (MCO) due to orbital space
launch operations at Cape Canaveral. U.S. Government archival data spanning ten
months and over 22,000 flights was accessed and categorized into three research
questions by day of week, time of day, and whether or not an orbital space launch
occurred during the established time frame. Inferential analysis using the one-way
ANOVA (RQ1) and two-way ANOVA (RQ2 and RQ3) was conducted and found
no significant differences in average Part 121 arrival delays into MCO due to
orbital space launch operations at Cape Canaveral. The study concluded that there
is at present no delay impact of statistical or practical significance on MCO from
orbital space launch operations at Cape Canaveral that could be detected by the
study at hand. While the findings of the current study will certainly stand for a
time, in the rapidly changing environments of both Part 121 aviation and orbital
space launch operations, it would be wise to monitor this issue on a regular basis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of orbital space launch
activity at Cape Canaveral on Part 121 arrival delays into Orlando International
Airport (MCO). This allowed for direct measurement of any delay impact that
orbital launches from Cape Canaveral are currently having on arriving Part 121
traffic into MCO. Within the context of this study, an orbital space launch was
defined as any occurrence, or recorded attempt, to send a payload from the surface
of the Earth to beyond the Karman Line that involved the activation of a Temporary
Flight Restriction (TFR), Restricted Area, or other National Airspace System
(NAS) traffic mitigation-related airspace. An arrival delay was defined as the
difference between scheduled arrival time and actual arrival time, as measured in
minutes. Optimal efficiency was defined as the condition which allows the
maximum amount of orbital space launches per week with minimal delay impact
on Part 121 operations.
Background and Rationale
There is an ever-increasing number of orbital launch operations originating
from the Cape Canaveral Spaceport. This is reflected by quantifiable year-overyear data, and also by an ever increasing number of commercial launch vendors
establishing operations either on or near the Cape Canaveral footprint. According
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to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Office of Commercial Space
Operations, in 2009, only one such launch occurred, while in 2019 there were 39
(Federal Aviation Administration (A), 2021). Further illustrating the exponentiallyincreasing rate of launches is the fact that in just the first three months of 2021, 32
orbital launches have already occurred (2021). According to Cukurtepe and Akgun
(2009), the availability of orbital launch windows is also rapidly declining as the
desire to launch increases. Cukurtepe and Akgun made a strong case for developing
and implementing space traffic management techniques to increase efficiency and
optimize launch systems (2009). Over ten years have passed since that study, and
still very little attention has been given to this area of aviation.
Just nearby, and directly at odds with the exponentially-growing orbital
space launch operations is Orlando International Airport (MCO), which itself is
experiencing large annual increases in Part 121 commercial flight activity, in terms
of both arrival/departure rates as well as by number of total annual passengers
screened by MCO TSA (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2020). MCO is
considered a core NAS airport by the FAA due to its status as a major hub for
several Part 121 carriers and function as a Class B airspace corridor in central
Florida (Federal Aviation Administration, 2016).
With both the orbital launch rates from Cape Canaveral, and the Part 121
operations at MCO growing exponentially over time, an airspace conflict is likely
inevitable. What is worse, the cracks of such an imminent conflict have already
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begun to show. In 2019 a single orbital test flight of a SpaceX Falcon Heavy launch
vehicle from Cape Canaveral resulted in hundreds of Part 121 flights in and out of
Florida being delayed and/or cancelled (Grush, 2019). Any orbital launch attempt
from Cape Canaveral requires the activation of certain TFR’s and other airspace
surrounding the range safety area around Cape Canaveral (Garceau, 2017). This
airspace overlaps the primary arrival corridors into several major Florida airports,
including MCO (2017). Thus, any time an orbital launch attempt occurs at Cape
Canaveral, special protective airspace is activated that blocks many of the NAS
arrival and departure corridors into MCO (2017). This means that air traffic
controllers must send aircraft around these airspace blockages, manually vectoring
them onto unoptimized arrival routes (2017). This specific process was described
well by Garceau (2017) who also illustrated that the reroute most commonly used
by controllers requires air traffic to be sent to the opposite side of the Florida
peninsula. This action will almost inevitably lead to the activation of a ground
delay program for arriving traffic into MCO. This process also leads to thousands
of extra miles traveled by Part 121 aircraft during orbital space launches, meaning
the waste of an unknown amount of fuel at a direct cost to individual air carriers,
the expulsion of tons of additional unnecessary carbon emissions, and perhaps
thousands of delayed passengers (Grush, 2019).
The FAA has clearly identified that an airspace issue of some degree has
already begun to occur between these two modes of transportation. The President
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of the Commercial Spaceflight Federation, Eric Stallmer, testified to the United
States Senate in 2019 that the FAA’s tools and systems for separating orbital
launch traffic and Part 121 air carrier traffic are severely unoptimized and outdated
(Grush, 2019). Further, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), the labor union
representing many Part 121 air carrier pilots in the United States, produced a
formal white paper in the same year that came to the same conclusions (Air Line
Pilots Association, 2019). ALPA also stated within their analysis, that the conflict
between orbital space launch traffic and Part 121 traffic was rapidly approaching
criticality (2019).
The calls for scientific analysis of this practical aviation problem became
so loud, in fact, that the FAA began work on at least one program that year that was
meant to attempt to reduce the impact of orbital launches from Cape Canaveral on
the National Airspace System (NAS). Called the Space Data Integrator, or SDI, the
tool is a piece of software meant for use by air traffic controllers to reduce the
conflict between orbital space launch activity and NAS traffic by reducing launch
range safety areas (Ngai, 2020). As of October 2021, the SDI has only been
partially fielded, and is lacking government funding to at least some degree (2020).
A conflict between the desire to conduct orbital launch operations from
Cape Canaveral and the desire to conduct Part 121 air carrier operations in and
around MCO is likely already occurring, and the situation could be rapidly
approaching a resource tug-of-war between the two transportation models for
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airspace. The simplest solution that could immediately reduce any NAS delay
impact occurring from orbital space launches at Cape Canaveral was to ensure that
the most efficient orbital launch slot assignment sequence is being utilized.
However, before such a slot assignment sequence could be designed, there were
two critical variables that needed evaluation. First, the current impact of orbital
space launches on airspace neighboring Cape Canaveral required measurement.
Second, a determination as to which orbital launch slots are more favorable for
reducing NAS delays needed to be made.
It was critical that this problem be solved now, before major delays to either
Part 121 traffic or orbital launch operations began to occur regularly. The
referenced works above clearly signified that a conflict of unknown severity
already existed between these two models of transportation. For that reason, this
practical aviation problem needed to be scientifically addressed in the very near
term.
Definition of Terms
1. Cape Canaveral was defined as the orbital space launch facilities in and
surrounding the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
properties located in Cape Canaveral, Florida, including the Kennedy Space
Center and associated Launch Pads 39A and 39B.
2. Orbital Space Launch was defined as any occurrence, or recorded attempt,
to send a payload from the surface of the Earth to beyond the Karman Line
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that involves the activation of a TFR, Restricted Area, or other National
Airspace System traffic mitigation-related airspace.
3. The Karman Line is generally considered to be the boundary between Earth
and space, the Karman Line lies at an altitude of 62 miles, or 100 kilometers
(National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service, 2016).
4. Part 121 Traffic was defined as commercial airline traffic considered to be
regularly scheduled by the FAA under FAR Part 121 (Federal Aviation
Administration (B), 2021).
5. Arrival Delay was defined as any difference, expressed in minutes, between
a scheduled Part 121 arrival time and the actual arrival time. This is also
referred to as a-zero.
6. Launch Window was defined as any period of time in which an orbital space
launch is designated to occur.
7. Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) was defined as an aera of airspace
restricted to transit due to a hazard (Federal Aviation Administration (A),
2021).
8. Restricted Area was defined as areas of special airspace that are subject to
traffic restrictions (Federal Aviation Administration (A), 2021).
9. Airspace was defined as a broad term meant to describe geometric areas of
the sky, both controlled and uncontrolled.
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10. National Airspace System (NAS) was defined as the airspace, navigation
systems, and facilities of the United States (Federal Aviation
Administration (A), 2020).
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Questions
The overall research question that guided this study was “What is the
effect of orbital space launches at Cape Canaveral on Part 121 arrival delays into
MCO?” This overall research question was supported by the following subquestions:
1. What was the difference in average Part 121 arrival delay lengths
between days that orbital launches from Cape Canaveral occurred and
non-launch days?
2. What was the difference in average Part 121 arrival delay lengths
between days that orbital launches from Cape Canaveral occurred and
non-launch days with respect to day of week?
3. What was the difference in average Part 121 arrival delay lengths
between days that orbital launches from Cape Canaveral occurred and
non-launch days with respect to time of day?
Research Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Part 121 arrival delays will be significantly higher on days in
which an orbital space launch occurred from Cape Canaveral.
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Hypothesis 2: Part 121 arrival delays will be significantly higher on specific
days of the week that orbital launches from Cape Canaveral occur when compared
to other days of the week that launches occurred.
Hypothesis 3: Part 121 arrival delays will be significantly higher during
specific times of day that orbital launches from Cape Canaveral occur when
compared to other times of day that launches occurred.
Preliminary Description of Variables
1. RQ1 utilized arrival delay in minutes as its continuous dependent
variable, and the dichotomous value of launch or no launch as its single
independent variable. Further description of the dependent and
independent variables for RQ1 are located in Chapter 3, below.
2. RQ2 utilized arrival delay in minutes as its continuous dependent
variable. RQ2 used two categorical independent variables: the
dichotomous value of launch or no launch, and the seven-level value of
day of week. Further description of the dependent and independent
variables for RQ2 are located in Chapter 3, below.
3. RQ3 utilized arrival delay in minutes as its continuous dependent
variable. RQ3 used two categorical independent variables: the
dichotomous value of launch or no launch, and the six-level value of
time of day. Further description of the dependent and independent
variables for RQ3 are located in Chapter 3, below.
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Study Design
The research methodology that was used for this analysis is quantitative,
associational research. The selected research design was ex post facto, effects type.
Quantitative research was the appropriate methodology to be used in this analysis
due to the need for all preliminary research questions to be addressed using
statistical analysis. A qualitative approach would fail to address any of the
preliminary research questions properly, therefore the use of either a qualitative or
a mixed-methods approach could be wholly excluded from consideration here.
Likewise, associational research was appropriate due to the lack of any intervention
within this study, thus excluding experimental research, and the direct need for
inferential statistics to be used to address the research questions, thus excluding
descriptive research from consideration from use within this study.
The ex post facto design was necessary due to the fact that group
differences were being measured, with each group and its corresponding dependent
variable data being pre-existing. The use of a correlational design, associational
research’s other arm, was inappropriate because the study did not examine a
relationship within a single group. The effects-type sub design was appropriate due
to the fact that the group membership variable was located on the independent
variable group for all research questions.
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Significance of Study
The significance of this study was that it produced a practical process
for solving a practical aviation industry problem. The specific problem in this case
was a lack of understanding regarding the current specific delay impact of
commercial space launches from Cape Canaveral on Part 121 traffic. The
preliminary literature analysis yielded that many already suspect that a conflict
between these two modes of transportation is already occurring, yet none had
postulated specifics regarding the degree of said conflict. Likewise, if there is a
severe problem currently occurring, what needs to be done about it? This study
addressed these matters by producing a practical process for industry adoption.
The practical process that was generated by this study is an orbital launch
window sequence that was developed using data produced by answering RQ1, RQ2
and RQ3. This sequencing model will be directly useful to aviation practitioners in
several sub-fields, such as air traffic control, space traffic control, Part 121 airline
scheduling, orbital launch window design, and major airport operations. This model
will enable maximum efficiency to be utilized by both modes of transportation
using presently existing air traffic control systems, thus providing a means for
larger amounts of both modes to exist with minimal conflict to each other.
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Study Limitations and Delimitations
Limitations
1.

Missing or Incomplete Archival Data. Any data that is missing, omitted, or
otherwise has been lost was not subject to my control. The use of official
U.S. government data sources, and data triangulation, should have
minimized the study’s exposure to this limitation.

2.

Airline Reporting Practices. This study assumed that all U.S. Department
of Transportation reporting requirements had been properly met by all Part
121 air carriers from which delay data is to be drawn. Likewise, if any
individual air carrier employees responsible for reporting said figures
misunderstood a reporting requirement, misidentified a reportable event, or
simply caused a human error in their reporting, that was beyond the
researcher’s control.

3. Real-time air carrier actions taken to mitigate delays. It is possible that as
orbital launch-related Part 121 re-routes and delays began to take place
across the Florida peninsula that individual air carriers took action to
minimize or mitigate the effects of such delays. This possibility was beyond
the researcher’s ability to control.
4. Skill of individual air traffic controllers during reroutes. Once orbital
launch activities begin at Cape Canaveral, ATC re-routes are required for
Part 121 traffic arriving into MCO. Many of these re-routings are manually
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conducted by air traffic controllers, and therefore, the individual differences
in aptitude for this task between controllers could cause an asymmetric
influence in the actual arrival delay figures from different days and time
periods. This was beyond the researcher’s capability to control.
5. Time length of orbital launch windows. The time length for which an orbital
launch window is approved for can vary from instantaneous, to several
hours in duration. The variance in time length of each launch window was
beyond the researcher’s ability to control.
6. Effects of Covid-19 on Air Travel. The volume of Part 121 flights fluctuated
following the March 2020 outbreak of Covid-19 and was not within the
control of the researcher.
Delimitations
1.

Decision to utilize selected archival data sources. The research questions
presented by this study were best addressed using ex post facto analysis,
and therefore using existing data was a necessity. Appropriate U.S.
government archives were selected for use in this study due to the high
probability that their contained data would have a high degree of integrity.
The selection of these data archives should have maximized the population
generalizability of the study’s results.

2.

Decision to examine MCO arrivals rather than arrivals and departures. In
order to properly measure the issue of orbital launch delays on Part 121
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traffic, the scope of study had to be narrow enough to allow for precise
results. Further, literature tells us that there is a spherical relationship
present between Part 121 arrival and departure delays that would have
affected the accuracy of the results of any statistical test that used both
metrics as dependent variables. This concept is expanded upon below, in
Chapter 2. Although outside of the scope of this study, this topic could
make for an interesting subject of follow-on research.
3. Decision to examine MCO and not Miami International (MIA) or other
south Florida airports. MCO was selected as the subject airport for this
study due to its closer proximity to Cape Canaveral’s range safety areas
compared to MIA and other south Florida airports. It was considered that a
comparison could be made between delay impacts at MCO and those at
MIA, however, after review, it was determined that this concept was outside
the scope of this project and better left for future academic research. It could
also be argued that the significantly smaller Melbourne Airport (MLB) is
more geographically closer to Cape Canaveral and may therefore suffer
from a more significant Part 121 delay impact due to this fact. While this
could be true, due to the very limited amount of daily Part 121 arrivals into
MLB, that hypothesis would be nearly impossible to evaluate statistically at
this time due to both the small available sample of MLB’s 121 arrivals and
likewise the resultant low power of any findings. The ecological
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generalizability of the results may have been affected by this to some
degree, however, the use of a single location for study controlled for the
potential effects of a location threat to internal validity.
4. Decision not to use pre-COVID-19 Part 121 archival data. This study was
focused on producing a slot-assignment model that would be practically
useful to future generations of professionals, as well as the current one. The
depression in Part 121 flying caused by Covid-19 was temporary, and in the
previous twelve months the rate of orbital space launches occurring from
Cape Canaveral has been exponentially increasing. Therefore, it was ideal
to collect data from the most recently-available archival records.
5. Decision to use the one-way ANOVA rather than independent-means t-test
in RQ1. As explained in Chapter 3, this study was already going to be
checking the data for compliance with the assumptions of the ANOVA for
addressing RQ2 and RQ3. Therefore, it was simpler to also use the
ANOVA to address RQ1, given that the one-way ANOVA theoretically
produced identical results to the independent-means t-test in the context of
this study. This should not have affected the generalizability of the study’s
results.
6. Decision to exclude delays coded due to weather from sample data. As
detailed in Chapters 2 and 3, each Part 121 delay analyzed by this study had
been coded by the Department of Transportation by delay cause. Given that
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MCO is located in central Florida and therefore is prone to tropical weather
patterns, no delays that were coded as due to weather were used as sample
data in this study. This action prevented the possible effects of weather as a
confounding variable on the study’s findings.
Foreword on Literature Review
The preliminary information identified in the background section of Chapter
1 yielded that a known conflict may already exist between Part 121 arrival delays
into MCO and orbital space launches from Cape Canaveral. Given that the primary
purpose of this study was to examine and measure the effects of orbital space
launch activity at Cape Canaveral on Part 121 arrival delays into MCO, it was
appropriate to move forward with a formal review of the available academic
literature concerning this subject.
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Chapter 2
Review of Related Literature
Introduction
The existing literature regarding the research problem at hand, like the
problem itself, is interdisciplinary in its foundations. The following review
examined a variety of studies meant to address, expand, or examine the processes
and procedures regarding the optimization of both air traffic and orbital space
traffic. In some contexts, studies will have examined these two modes of
transportation separately, and in other contexts, the intent of said studies will have
been to mitigate operational friction between the two.
As illustrated below, there is no shortage of simulation work that has been
done to model the effects of orbital space launches on NAS traffic, however, no
significant work had been conducted that made an assessment of the current NAS
delay conflict from orbital space launches by measuring actual Part-121 delay data.
Key to understanding the current state of research surrounding the impact of orbital
space launches on NAS delays is comprehension of three sub-domains: The
underlying dynamics of NAS delays, existing work on the relationship between
NAS delays and space launch activity, and core concepts surrounding spaceport
design and space traffic control systems.
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Review of Past Research Studies
The Dynamics of NAS Delays
A significant body of scientific work exists on the general subject of Part
121 delays, their underlying causes, and preventative measures. Lemetti et al.
(2019) produced a correlational study which measured the European equivalent of
Part 121 arrival delays into the Stockholm International Airport and determined the
practical implications of said delays. Lemetti et al. operationally defined practical
impact from arrival delays as fuel consumed, miles flown, and emissions produced.
Lemetti et al. had a primary research objective of identifying potential relationships
between the multi-level categorical independent variable of time, and a continuous
dependent variable of length of delay. In their findings, Lemetti et al. successfully
identified that in certain delay events, daily fuel burns for arriving aircraft were up
to 6% higher than average. Lemetti et al. recommended follow-on work be
conducted in the areas of weather-based arrival delays, and other factors. It could
be inferred from the wording of their recommendations for future research that
Lemetti et al. would likely endorse research into the effect of any factors that could
cause Part 121 arrival delays, including the effects of orbital space launches.
Lemetti et al. was conducted in the vicinity of Stockholm International
Airport, which is a European hub airport that is not significantly different from
Orlando International Airport in operational capacity or airspace design. Likewise,
the fuel burn computational equations used in Lemetti et al. account for fluctuations
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in density altitude, temperature, and other performance-effecting factors that would
affect fuel burn, which indicates that the same equations could be used in future
similar or replication studies. For that reason, it is likely that the results of Lemetti
et al. could be ecologically generalized to nearly any major hub airport, including
Orlando International (MCO). Lemetti et al. did provide significant mathematical
operational definitions for their computations of excess fuel burns caused by ATC
delays, and in these formulaic definitions is the true value of their study. However,
Lemetti et al. failed to provide specific statistical results from any inferential
analysis that they may have conducted in their work. To elaborate, Lemetti et al.
did originally aim to determine if there was a relationship between certain factors
and air carrier delays, however, upon reading their findings, there were no
inferential tests (such as a Pearson’s r, or perhaps multiple regression and
correlation) conducted. Lemetti et al.’s approach could be improved upon using the
study’s existing research question and variables, if only multiple regression and
correlation were used, and appropriate results were reported in their findings. It is
unclear whether this omission by the authors was due to their own decision as a
study delimitation or that of a publisher-driven content limitation.
In the context of the study at hand, while Lemetti et al. did not directly aim to
measure the effects of orbital space launches on arrival delays into Stockholm
International Airport (nor is there a spaceport of note in the immediate vicinity of
Stockholm), their lack of analysis in this area certainly affords the opportunity for
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further research into that category of delays. Likewise, their operational definitions
of delay impact informed decisions regarding delimitations on this subject within
the study at hand.
A more empirically-consequential quantitative work on the subject of air
carrier disruptions and delays is found in Lonzius and Lange (2017). The primary
research question of Lonzius and Lange can be inferred as “Is there a difference in
delay rates between air carriers that use hub and spoke networks, and those that do
not?” Lonzius and Lange conducted a study that utilized an ex post facto causetype design that examined the differences in arrival delays across different Part 121
U.S. air carriers. Lonzius and Lange chose to use average annual arrival delay as
their continuous dependent variable, and the twelve continuous variables of arrivals
delayed from scheduled time, direct hub connectivity, indirect hub connectivity,
routings with swap opportunities, load factor, delayed flights on arrival, percentage
of slot controlled airports, percentage of congested airports, weather-related delay,
peak time flights, and concentration (2017, p. 106).
Lonzius and Lange provided appropriate descriptive statistics concerning
their sample of N = 196,412 flights and utilized multiple regression and correlation
as the statistical test for their inferential analysis (2017). The source of Lonzius and
Lange’s sample data were various official U.S. Government archives, primarily the
Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2017). It is notable that Lonzius and Lange
recognized the aforementioned spherical relationship between arrival and departure
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delays and opted to use arrival delays as their dependent variable (2017, p. 102); a
delimitation which the authors supported with evidence from their own literature
review. Lonzius and Lange used convenience sampling to collect their archival data
from the years 2006 – 2013, including statistics from American Airlines, Alaska
Airlines, JetBlue Airways, Delta Air Lines, ExpressJet Airlines, Frontier Airlines,
AirTran, Hawaiian Airlines, SkyWest Airlines, United Airlines, US Air, Southwest
Airlines, and Mesa Airlines (2015, p. 102-103).
Lonzius and Lange found that Part 121 air carriers who utilized direct hub
network routing were less prone to delays compared to those carriers that used
indirect routing, R2 = .21, F(1,366, 196,412) = 6.71, p < .01 (2017, p. 107).
Referencing these results, Lonzius and Lange concluded that air carriers should use
direct hub routing strategies when conducting network planning combined with
robust planning techniques (2017).
Upon review of the sampling strategy it is immediately apparent that there
was a major threat to internal validity present in this study by way of the mortality
threat. It is interesting to identify a mortality threat in this unusual context,
however, it is nonetheless present. Because the authors collected data from 2006 –
2013, an objectively large timespan for a study of this nature, some carriers that
existed in 2006 at the beginning of the surveyed time period were either defunct,
merged, or otherwise non-existent by the end of the surveyed time period in 2013.
For example, in that timeframe AirTran was eventually purchased by Southwest
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Air and US Air merged with American Airlines. It is possible that the
independence assumption of the multiple regression and correlation test was
affected by this relationship, however, that detail would ultimately fall on how the
delay data utilized by the study was reported and recorded during the years in
which these mergers occurred; something the authors failed to identify or explore.
A simple example of this possible threat is the data collected by the authors for
2011, the year in which Southwest Airlines bought AirTran: It is conceivable that
the database kept Southwest and AirTran’s respective delay statistics as separate
records until the day of the actual merger, and then began recording them as one.
However, it is also possible that the database records for 2011 unintentionally
reported AirTran’s delay data under both AirTran and Southwest Airlines for some
time period in 2011. In this latter case, the independence assumption of multiple
regression and correlation would have been violated, and it is probable that a nonparametric test would have been more appropriate.
Even in the absence of this unchecked threat to internal validity, the use of
multiple regression and correlation within this study by Lonzius and Lange is
somewhat questionable, given that the intent of the study was to examine group
differences between different data sets (2017). That is not to say that their use of
multiple regression and correlation failed to produce appropriate results, however,
their use of multiple regression and correlation in this manner required the authors
to code multiple dummy variables, such as weather effect, in order to force the
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computation to work. However, upon examination of the independent variables
used by the authors it is clear that by using these variables categorically rather than
in a continuous format, the factorial ANOVA could have been utilized.
Lonzius and Lange (2017) provided further support to the study at hand for
using arrival delays in minutes, rather than both departure and arrival delays, as a
dependent variable. Lonzius and Lange also provided insight into the inner
mechanics of Part 121 NAS delays and factors that can exacerbate them. This
finding was relevant to the study at hand in that findings produced by the current
study required filtration for exogenous variables, one of which could have been an
airline’s underlying network structure and its ability to recover from or exacerbate
from induced delays due to said network structure.
When measuring the impact of orbital space launch operations on Part 121
delays it is possible to operationally define “impact” by multiple metrics. Lemetti et
al. (2019), above, demonstrated a cost-based evaluation model that estimated
aircraft fuel burns per additional mile flown. Likewise, Lonzius and Lange (2017)
operationally defined impact as arrival delay in minutes from scheduled (a-zero).
From Lemetti et al. (2019) we can also derive metrics that would operationally
define flight delay impact in terms of both additional milage flown, and
furthermore, additional emissions produced. This is notwithstanding the
sometimes-used technique of measuring arrival delays in terms of minutes different
than scheduled by greater than 15 minutes, referred to as “a-15,” or the more
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obvious operational definition that utilizes the number of passengers
inconvenienced. Beygi et al. (2007) was composed prior to Lemetti et al. (2009) yet
it provides additional insight into the dynamics of air carrier delays. Beygi et al.
was a quantitative analysis that was published with nearly all of its empirical results
hidden due to non-disclosure agreements with the air carriers that participated in
the study. However, the delay propagation model that was produced by Beygi is
still of value in itself, even if the statistical methods used to construct it have been
redacted. Figure 2.1, below, illustrates the basics of how an airline delay can impact
additional flights that follow it in schedule.
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Figure 2.1. Airline Delay Propagation Tree
Note. Taken from (Beygi et al., 2007, p. 3).
Simply put, given that an air carrier had access to a finite number of aircraft in
a given time period, it is possible that if an aircraft has an arrival delay, that the
next flight scheduled to be operated by that aircraft (and separately by that flight
crew) will be impacted by a rolling delay (Beygi et al., 2007). In statistical
terminology, we would call this a spherical relationship between arrival delays and
departure delays. This sphericity in delay data is relevant to the quantitative
methodology of this study and will be built upon further in Chapter 3. It is
unfortunate that data redaction made critical analysis of the rest of Beygi et al.
practically impossible.
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While the measurement metric of an airline delay is important, it is equally
important to survey work that has explored the drivers of airline delays. As
mentioned above, very little work of scholarly quality has been produced that
aimed to measure the effects of orbital space launches on Part 121 delays, however,
there was additional work available that compared and/or evaluated the core drivers
of Part 121 delays. Bradford and Scheraga (2020) conducted such an analysis
relatively recently using a quantitative methodology and an ex post facto effectstype design.
Bradford and Scheraga used the Chi Square goodness-of-fit test to make
group comparisons of average delays across different categorical values of delay
cause. Bradford and Scheraga used delay data in minutes as their continuous
dependent variable, and the categorical value of delay cause as their independent
variable. The independent variable categories were weather, non-weather NAS
delays, air carrier, and security (2020, p. 1). Bradford and Scheraga used a sample
size of N = 12,692,341 flights spread across thirteen years, that were collected from
official United States Government archive sources. In their findings, Bradford and
Scheraga reported that 49.1% of Part 121 delays found in their sample were due to
the air carrier itself, either due to maintenance, crew, or late arriving aircraft
(2020). Note that Bradford and Scheraga disregarded the aforementioned sphericity
effect of airline delay propagation identified by Beygi, et al. (2007) in their data
analysis. Bradford and Scheraga also reported that 34.24% of the delays found
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within their sample were due to weather, and 16.33% were due to non-weather
NAS delays (2020). Based off of the operational definitions provided by Bradford
and Scheraga, it is clear that any delays caused by orbital space launch activity
would have been coded into the “non-weather NAS delay” independent variable.
Overall, the value of the descriptive statistics data produced by Bradford and
Scheraga were good, however, they failed to provide some critical information
regarding their inferential analysis using the Chi-Square.
Bradford and Scheraga used their descriptive data to then compare actual
delay rates against those predicted by four separate models using the Chi-Square
Goodness of Fit test. However, while Bradford and Scheraga did report that three
of the four Chi-Square tests had findings that were statistically insignificant, they
did not provide the actual Chi-Square values, their critical values, or their p-values.
The single exception is their statistically significant finding of X2 (1, N =
12,692,341) = 11.34, p < .01 for model two’s predictive delay trend compared to
the observed delay trend (Bradford & Scheraga, 2020). For this reason, the
information from Bradford and Scheraga that was most useful to the study at hand
was their descriptive statistics. Bradford and Scheraga used archival data from
official U.S. Government sources, and it can therefore be inferred that the integrity
of said database, and thus the integrity of their sample data, was good.
Bradford and Scheraga’s research could have been improved in several
ways. It is clear that Bradford and Scheraga used convenience sampling and
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collected all available data from the selected years. In place of this, Bradford and
Scheraga could have computed an a-priori sample size calculation and used that as
a reference point for sample size. It is also possible that had random sampling been
utilized from the existing pool of data, that said sample would have been viable for
a parametric omnibus test such as a factorial ANOVA. The easiest improvement
that could be made to Bradford and Scheraga (2020) would have been the full
disclosure of the statistics related to their inferential analysis. The key takeaway
from Bradford and Scheraga is that 34.24% of Part 121 delays from 2006 - 2019
were coded as weather-related, and 16.33% were coded as non-weather NAS
(2020). This informs a conclusion that some unknown percentage of the 16.33%
non-weather NAS delay statistic was due to orbital space launch activity, although
it is impossible to quantify exactly what proportion of the 16.33% was related to
this factor without further information from either the authors or the underlying
database that was used.
Of the above-surveyed works, many were applicable to the study at hand
but stopped short of exploring the effects of space launch activity on NAS traffic.
Srivastava et al. (2018) produced a quantitative work of a similar variety that did
not specifically research NAS delays due to orbital space launches, but rather,
conducted a correlational study on the relationship between closing random
airspace segments and NAS delays (2018). In this regard, findings from Srivastava
et al. could be ecologically generalized in the context of a work that concerns NAS
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delays due to airspace closures for any reason, including space launch activity. In
fact, Srivastava et al. specifically stated within their abstract that airspace closures
due to space launch activity were one of many phenomenon that the work aimed to
explore further (2018, p. 1).
Srivastava et al. (2018) used a predictive correlational design that made use
of archival flight and airspace route data from 2011 - 2016. Srivastava et al. had a
primary research goal to identify if there was a relationship between NAS airspace
closures and flight delays, and a secondary goal of extracting a regression equation
that could be used to predict the future delay impacts of closing certain NAS
airspace sectors. These NAS test sectors were divided into certain geographical
areas and designated North-West, Center, West, East, and Florida (Srivastava, et
al., 2018). Figure 2.2 illustrates the geographic boundaries covered by each NAS
test sector.
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Figure 2.2. Illustration of Test Sectors Utilized
Note. Taken from (Srivastava et al., 2018, p. 18). Boundaries are depicted in Red.
While Srivastava et al. failed to adequately operationally define their measure
of flight delay, and likewise failed to demonstrate proper descriptive information
regarding their sample, they did produce one finding of interest: For random
airspace closures in the Florida NAS region, their regression equation was able to
forecast future delay impact of airspace closures in Florida with an accuracy of R2
= .949 (Srivastava et al., 2018, p. 15).
Srivastava et al. concluded that the increasing activity from orbital space
launches, and other sources, was adding strain to the NAS via flight delays (2018,
p. 27) . Srivastava et al. recommended that further work on “what if” analysis
regarding NAS airspace closures be conducted so that NAS traffic delays could be
minimized or mitigated. In the context of the study at hand, this final
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recommendation for future work could be extrapolated to yield that the authors
would likely concur that future research to prevent NAS delays due to airspace
closures caused by space launch activity would be appropriate.
Existing Work on NAS Delays Due to Space Launch Activity
Tinoco et al. (2018) produced a content analysis that simulated the general
effects of commercial space operations from both Cape Canaveral and Jacksonville
Cecil Spaceport on aircraft delays. Tinoco et al. conducted their simulation by
modeling the flight path of certain orbital launch vehicles from both of the
aforementioned launch points and produced a predictive trend for future cumulative
delays on the NAS. The delay impact forecasts that Tinoco et al. produced did
factor expected increasing year over year trends in both NAS traffic density and
space launch operations projected by the FAA. Of course, these trends were
predictive in nature. While the work of Tinoco et al. was not totally in vain, it was
very topical in its analysis of the issue at hand (the delay impact of orbital space
launches on NAS traffic) in that no inferential analysis was conducted. Using the
modeling technique described above, Tinoco et al. found that by 2027 the orbital
launches from Cape Canaveral would result in approximately 2000 minutes of
delay impact in the NAS networks immediately surrounding Cape Canaveral (2018,
p. 17).
While Tinoco et al.’s projections on the whole demonstrate an impending
conflict between orbital launch operations and NAS traffic in central Florida, their
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work fails to produce the type of inferential analysis that academic rigor generally
calls for. Tinoco et al. produced an excellent literature review and appear to have
used reasonable FAA traffic forecast data for their simulations. However, Tinoco et
al. also modeled the effects of orbital space launch activity from Jacksonville Cecil
Airport/Spaceport (2018). The decision to model this effect could have been
exploratory in nature, however, whatever the case of their intentions, as of 2021
there is no orbital launch activity occurring from Jacksonville Cecil
Airport/Spaceport, nor has consideration been given to hosting operations from
Virgin Galactic as their model simulates. Tinoco et al. also failed to operationally
define “delay” in the context of their results. For example, it is unclear if the 2000
minutes of Part 121 arrival delays were exclusively into MCO, or an aggregate of
all air traffic in central Florida divided evenly between all airports within a certain
radius of Cape Canaveral. Tinoco et al. committed a critical flaw in their findings
by failing to explain this key information. It is important to note, however, that
even if Tinoco et al. had properly defined the key information related to their
findings, their work is still ultimately a simulation rather than a measurement of the
current impact of space operations on the NAS in Florida.
With regard to Tinoco et al. (2018), a follow-on work that also simulated the
effects of orbital space launches from Cape Canaveral on Part 121 NAS traffic was
produced in 2020. Tinoco et al. (2020) is a superior work to its aforementioned
predecessor. Tinoco et al. (2020) produces a proper operational definition of NAS
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delay and determines a simulated average delay during a particular orbital space
launch from Cape Canaveral to be 5 minutes per flight spread across 21 affected
Part 121 flights (2020, p. 25). The core issue with Tinoco et al. (2020) is the same
issue that is found within the enormous volume of available works related to this
subject including Bojorquez and Chen (2019), Tompa et al. (2015), the quantitative
component of Srivastava et al. (2015), ad nauseum. These works all utilized a
content analysis methodology that made use of a simulation model to predict the
impact of orbital launch operations on Part 121 NAS traffic. None of the
aforementioned sub-category of papers examined the issue at hand using actual Part
121 delay data from orbital launch events, though such data is readily accessible
from official FAA archives. This is a shortfall that in all likelihood can be corrected
in future work within this domain.
While it is apparent that no significant purely quantitative work has been
conducted to measure the observed effects of space launch activity on Part 121
delays, Srivastava et al. (2015) represents a mixed-methods work that is relevant to
this topic. Srivastava et al. is fundamentally a two-part study; it could likely have
even been published as two separate documents if the authors desired such. The
first half of Srivastava et al. is a quantitative content analysis that used various
models to produce descriptive statistics on the effect of future space launches on
NAS traffic (2015). In this regard, Srivastava made no evolution beyond previous
works of this nature already surveyed in this review and therefore it was not of
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relevance. However, the second (and far more relevant) half of Srivastava et al. was
a qualitative case study on the effects of an actual orbital space launch from Cape
Canaveral on NAS traffic (2015). The single orbital space launch that Srivastava
chose to conduct their case study on was the launch of NASA’s Orion Exploration
Flight Test (EFT-1) mission from Cape Canaveral, which occurred on December
5th, 2014, at 1205 GMT (Srivastava et al., 2015, p. 7).
Srivastava et al. observed that 88 NAS flights were delayed by the Orion
EFT-1 launch, and that the average flight was rerouted 4.34 NM (2015, p. 10).
Srivastava et al. likewise made the decision to also observe the number of NAS
flights delayed on previous days during aborted launch attempts. This delimitation
by the authors allows for comparisons of delay rates to be observed anecdotally
between launch windows that occurred during different days of the week, and
during different time periods. The histogram illustrated in Figure 2.3 reflects the
variance in number of NAS fights delayed during the various launch windows of
Orion EFT-1.
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Figure 2.3. Daily Launch Window Delay Variance
Note. Taken from (Srivastava et al., 2015, p. 11). The y-axis depicts number of
flights delayed on a given date, and the x-axis depicts different launch window
dates. There is no relevant difference between the red and blue bars.
Srivastava et al. produced a detailed case study with moderate descriptive
adequacy. The rating of moderate is assigned due to the omission of some key
operational definitions by the authors, such as what their specific definition of
“NAS flights.” The term NAS flights could be interpreted as Part 121 flights, or
alternatively as any flight on an IFR flight plan, or even further as any aircraft in
controlled airspace, and it is unclear exactly how this term was used by the authors.
Further, the qualitative component of the study does appear to conform to the
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dependability standard of rigor, given that the observations made could be repeated
in future work given the contents of Srivastava et al.’s descriptions.
The qualitative component of Srivastava et al. was extremely relevant to the
study at hand given that its authors elected to observe the effects of the Orion EFT1 launch on NAS traffic. Specifically, the finding of Srivastava et al. illustrated
above in Figure 3 indicates that at least in the case of the Orion EFT-1 launch, there
was observable variance in the number of NAS delays caused depending on the day
and time of a given launch window. The observation of a single launch event was
ultimately anecdotal; however, it gives credibility to the research hypotheses of the
present study that there will be variance in the number of NAS delays caused by a
space launch event due to day of week and time of day in which a launch window
occurred.
Spaceport Design and Space Traffic Control
It is plausible that one of the most fundamental sources of airspace
conflicts between orbital launch traffic and NAS Part 121 traffic is due to preexisting geographical proximities between major airports and officially designated
spaceports. These airspace conflicts are ultimately what result in measurable Part
121 NAS delays. In that regard, limited work (if any) has been done to mitigate the
potential for said conflicts through spaceport integration design. Chang and Chen
(2021) provided a compelling qualitative overview of the state of competing
spaceport design as part of their primary research goal to identify candidate
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spaceports in Taiwan. However, their work served as a qualitative content analysis,
and no quantitative work was completed. Some of the different designs identified
by Chang and Chen were the integrated combined air and spaceport (such as
Jacksonville Cecil Field in the United States), neighboring spaceports (such as
Cape Canaveral/Kennedy Space Center as compared to Orlando International
Airport), and the speculative offshore launch concept that has been proposed by
SpaceX (2021).
While coded categories generated from the qualitative overview of varying
spaceport integration designs could be of value, significantly more value would be
derived from an ex post facto study that made group comparisons between the
different designs across a common dependent variable. A work of this design and
methodology was sought for inclusion within this review, however, none could be
located. The most similar work of this nature that could be located was Colvin and
Alonso (2015).
Colvin and Alonso (2015) produced quantitative work on space traffic
control techniques via an effects type ex post facto study that had an overall
research goal of assessing NAS delay differences between different types of safety
envelopes. Multiple continuous dependent variables were used by Colvin and
Alonso, including delay in minutes, additional distance traveled, number of flights
rerouted, and additional fuel burned. Colvin and Alonso used a dichotomous
categorical independent variable in all statistical computations of traditional versus
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compact launch safety window. The sample used by Colvin and Alonso was a
group of N = 90 Part 121 flights that were collected from an unknown archival data
source and overlaid onto certain simulated launch profiles (2015). It is fair to
assume that the sample data Colvin and Alonso used was taken from either an
official U.S. Government archival source such as the Department of Transportation
Bureau of Transportation Statistics, or a non-governmental source such as Flight
Aware. In either case, the integrity of the sample data is objectively high, given that
neither of these aforementioned archival data sources, be they governmental or not,
display flight data that is not directly correlated to a live flight.
Colvin and Alonso overlaid their sample flights over a model of various
launch vehicle profiles to forecast delays (2015). Colvin and Alonso found that
there was a significant difference in Part 121 delays when using a traditional launch
safety envelope over a compact envelope (2015, p. 8). Colvin and Alonso produced
a set of 95% confidence intervals to illustrate interval estimates of the additional
delay effect caused by the use of traditional launch safety envelopes, of which, the
largest difference was µ = 1.633, 95% CI [1.350, 1.916 ] (2015, p. 8). In this key
finding of Colvin and Alonso the dependent variable was number of flights
rerouted, which could be interpreted to mean that using a traditional launch safety
envelope rather than the more modern compact envelope could result in up to two
additional Part 121 flights per hour being rerouted. Colvin and Alonso ultimately
concluded that by using a combination of predictive software and compact launch
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envelopes, NAS safety could be preserved while nearly all delays due to space
launch activity could be mitigated (2015, p. 13). It is important to note that Colvin
and Alonso reference a program called SU-FARM in their original print’s
conclusions, although as of 2021 there has been no adoption of this software by the
FAA.
The immediate weakness observed in Colvin and Alonso’s work is their
use of a space launch model overlay rather than actual data from days in which
space launches occur. For example, rather than overlay their sample Part 121 flights
onto a template of launches that used both traditional and compact launch
envelopes Colvin and Alonso could have used actual observations on days in which
space launch activity occurred. Given that this work was produced in 2015, well
before SpaceX and others significantly entered the orbital launch industry, it is
absolutely conceivable that there was simply an insufficient amount of orbital space
launches for the authors to produce such a work. As of 2021, it appears that there
are more than enough annual orbital space launches for a similar study using actual
archival data from days in which an orbital space launch occurred to be used.
Kaltenhauser et al. (2017) conducted a qualitative case study on the state of
various initiatives to integrate commercial space launch activity into Europe’s
equivalent of the NAS using an inductive analysis approach. A key focus of
Kaltenhauser et al. was the exploration of different launch platforms and their
interaction with airspace restrictions (2017). To that end, Kaltenhauser analyzed
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conventional land or sea-based orbital space launches, air-launched orbital rockets,
deorbiting vehicles, and sub-orbital point to point travel (2017, p. 245).
Kaltenhauser also explored the potential uses of digital information processes to
increase efficiency (operationally defined as reducing European NAS arrival delays
in minutes) during launch events (2015). Figure 2.4 illustrates a simplified
illustration of the airspace conflict caused by a space vehicle reentry event.

Figure 2.4. Illustration of the Airspace Conflict Generated by Deorbiting
Spacecraft
Note. Taken from (Kaltenhauser, et al., 2015, p. 246).
Kaltenhauser et al. ultimately recommended that one of the digital process
that their case study surveyed, System Wide Information Management (SWIM), be
implemented into a real-time space launch delay mitigation process that they
produced as a result of their study. This process is illustrated by Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5. Real-Time Launch Delay Prevention Process
Note. Taken from (Kaltenhauser et al., 2017, p. 248).
The key concern of Kaltenhauser et al. is the question of the transferability
of its results to the U.S. space launch industry and NAS. When a question of
whether or not the transferability qualitative standard of rigor has been met arises,
what is really being asked concerns the descriptive adequacy of the study in
question. In the case of Kaltenhauser et al., the descriptive adequacy of their work
was apparent in their thick description. This is further evidenced by the process
which they produced shown in Figure 2.5, which could easily be templated into the
American NAS for use. Kaltenhauser et al. did suffer from a lack of in-person
interviews, particularly in their sections which detailed European ATC systems and
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the interaction of individual controllers with said systems. Had Kaltenhauser et al.
conducted a limited number of interviews with actual European controllers, not
only could a coding process have been used to further develop their process, but
member-checks could have been used to validate said process for practicality.
Kaltenhauser et al. was relevant to the study at hand as it identifies key
processes that could potentially cause or mitigate airspace conflicts during space
launch activities. It is possible that if the study at hand observed significant Part
121 delays occurring at MCO due to orbital space launches at Cape Canaveral, that
said delays could be minor enough to be managed with software such as SWIM, or
a prominent U.S. equivalent currently in development such as the aforementioned
SDI program from Chapter 1 of this study. Finally, although Kaltenhauser et al.
was published in 2015, their selection of launch systems to explore proves to be far
ahead of its time. For example, Kaltenhauser et al. explored inter-atmospheric
launch systems and sea-based orbital launches, neither of which were in serious
development in 2015 however, both of which are currently being seriously
proposed by companies in the U.S. space launch industry.
Summary and Study Implications
Coalescing the content of the reviewed-works above and extracting core
concepts relevant to the design of the study at hand was critical for ensuring the
quality of the study at hand’s design. Recalling the introductory section of this
chapter, it was identified that the most appropriate method to use for examination
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of existing research into the complex relationship between orbital space launch
activity and Part 121 NAS delays was to break that overall knowledge domain into
three supporting sub-domains: Works involving the underlying dynamics of NAS
delays, existing work on the relationship between NAS delays and space launch
activity, and core concepts surrounding spaceport design and space traffic control
systems. Now that a comprehensive review of literature within these sub-domains
has been completed, what were the core take-aways with regard to the study at
hand?
Returning to the works of both Lemetti et al. (2019) and Lonzius and
Lange (2017), a critical take away from both studies was the decisions by both of
their respective authors in how to operationally define a flight delay. This decision
represents a key delimitation in both studies, and likewise, the quality of their
results informed what is a key delimitation within the study at hand.
It is also critical to include Beygi et al. (2007) into this conversation, which
while objectively an earlier work in the context of time, was also superior in design
and the practical value of its findings compared to Lemetti et al. (2019). It is
unfortunate that the publicly-available version of Beygi et al. was heavily redacted
due to non-disclosure agreements with the air carriers involved in their work; this
may be a consequence of using source data from air carriers and informed that
decision in the context of the study at hand. Referencing Figure 1, Beygi et al.
ultimately designed a delay propagation model that illustrated the spherical
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relationship between arrival and departure delays, demonstrating that due to a finite
number of aircraft and crew, an arrival delay can propagate into several additional
departure delays in a waterfall effect.
The concept of a causal relationship between arrival and departure delays
in Part 121 operations is critical to understand for designing research
methodologies in this domain, as it may or may not be desirable for a study to have
multiple dependent variables that are affecting each other. In most cases, including
the study at hand, this effect was not desirable. Bradford and Scheraga (2020)
reported relevant findings that 34.24% of the Part 121 delays found within their
sample were due to weather, and 16.33% were due to non-weather NAS delays,
however, because Bradford and Scheraga discarded the spherical effect between
their dependent variables identified by Beygi et al.’s (2007) work, it is possible that
these findings were inaccurate. Using this information, the study at hand chose to
respect the spherical relationship between Part 121 arrival and departure delays
identified in the existing literature and opted to utilize arrival delays as its single
dependent variable.
While there were no locatable works that measured the actual relationship
between space launch activity and Part 121 NAS delays, there were several studies
that came close to this topic. Srivastava et al. (2018) explored NAS delays due to
random airspace closures, with the intent of forecast the delay effects of airspace
closures due to multiple reasons including space launch activity. Srivastava et al.

43

(2015) conducted a likewise tangentially-related work, who’s qualitative
component shed insight on the effects of the launch of the Orion EFT-1 mission
from Cape Canaveral on Part 121 flights in the Florida peninsula. While no
inferential analysis on this subject was pursued by Srivastava et al. (2015), their
work did capture an anecdotal observation that was not an original objective of
their work but is critically informative to the study at hand: Due to multiple delays
of the EFT-1 launch, its launch windows covered multiple days and time periods
and as shown by Srivastava et al. (2015) in Figure 3 of the above review, there was
an observed variance in the number of flight delays between the different launch
windows. This variance, confirmation of its existence and its exact measurement
using inferential analyses were all research goals of the study at hand.
Further content analysis-type work on this subject by Tinoco et al. (2018)
and Tinoco et al. (2020) was informative on the general subject of the relationship
between orbital space launches and NAS delays, however, their usefulness to the
study at hand ended there due to fundamental design issues with their respective
works. As stated previously, this design issue was the same problem that was found
within the enormous volume of available works related to this subject including
Bojorquez and Chen (2019), Tompa et al. (2015) and the quantitative component of
Srivastava et al. (2015). These works all utilized a content analysis methodology
that made use of a simulation model to predict the impact of orbital launch
operations on Part 121 NAS traffic. None of the aforementioned sub-category of
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papers examined the issue at hand using actual Part 121 delay data from orbital
launch events, though such data is readily accessible from official FAA archives.
Whether actual data was insufficient in quality during the conduct of these studies,
or their authors simply overlooked using actual delay data as a possibility, this is a
shortfall that was corrected by the study at hand.
In understanding the comprehensive body of works surrounding the
research problem at hand, it was also important to explore the possibility of
extraneous factors such as design, systems, and geography that could be inflaming
airspace conflicts between orbital space launches and Part 121 NAS delays. This
was an important consideration because if the study at hand identified a significant
relationship between Part 121 arrival delays into MCO and orbital space launches
from Cape Canaveral, such findings would have to be vetted for the effects of
extraneous variables.
Chang and Chen (2021) explored categorical factors that could be used to
objectively rate the quality of a spaceport’s location. Likewise, Colvin and Alonso
(2015) quantitatively explored how using different launch safety envelopes during
orbital space launches could variably effect NAS delay impacts. Lonzius and Lange
(2017) further explored the propensity of an air carrier’s network and operational
system designs to either inflame or reduce an NAS arrival delay. Finally, relevant
to this subject was the work of Kaltenhauser et al. (2017), that continued in this
same vein to explore the impact of communication software on mitigating or
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inflaming NAS delays due to space launch activity. All of these previous works
informed the study at hand because they demonstrated objective and/or quantitative
measurements of factors that are considered extraneous variables to the study at
hand.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Population and Sample
Population
The target population of this study was all Part 121 arrival delays into MCO
caused by orbital space launches from Cape Canaveral, and the accessible
population was all Part 121 arrival delays into MCO caused by orbital launches
from Cape Canaveral, as recorded by the United States Department of
Transportation Aviation Statistics Database.
According to the official archival records of the U.S. Government held
within the Department of Transportation Bureau of Transportation Statistics,
between July of 2020 and July of 2021 (the most recent twelve month span of data
currently available) MCO experienced a total of N = 116,637 arriving Part 121
flights from eleven unique U.S. air carriers: Endeavor Air (9E), American Airlines
(AA), Alaska Airlines (AS), JetBlue Airways (B6), Delta Air Lines (DL), Frontier
Airlines (F9), Hawaiian Airlines (HA), Spirit Airlines (NK), United Airlines (UA),
Southwest Airlines (WN) and Republic Airlines (YX), (Bureau of Transportation
Statistics (B), 2021). This archive did not track arrival information for foreign
carriers during the established time period, nor did it collect arrival data on nonPart 121 carriers such as Part 135 domestic charter operators. This delay tracking
archival source is referred to as Transtats Tool-B in lower sections of this chapter.
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Of the MCO N = 116,637 Part 121 arrivals within the time period identified
above, N = 19,116 were officially coded as delayed (2021). Transtats Tool-B coded
delays into sub-categories by general cause and provided both the percentage and
raw number of affected flights that were in a particular delay category. These
categories were weather (62.14%), Volume (27.74%), Equipment (0.93%), Closed
Runway (4.59%), and Other (4.59%) (2021). As identified in the literature review
within Chapter 2 of this study, any delay due to orbital space launch activity would
have been coded as “Other,” the proportion of which yields a possible population
of up to N = 5,354 MCO Part 121 arriving flight delays due to such a cause during
the established time period. It was impossible to derive exactly what proportion of
the “other” sub-population of delays was due to space launch activity. Likewise, it
was also possible that delayed flights due to space launch activity were mis-coded
into the “Volume” category. Figure 6 illustrates a breakdown of MCO Part 121
arrival delays by cause that occurred between July 2020 and July 2021.
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Figure 3.1. MCO NAS Delays by Cause, July 2020 – July 2021
Note. Completed with data from (Bureau of Transportation Statistics (B), 2021).
a

Percentages are of the total flight population of N = 116,637 flights.
A key issue with the tracking capability of Transtats Tool-B was that it only

appeared to collect data on Part 121 flights which were delayed greater than 15
minutes from scheduled arrival time. Recall from Chapter 2 of this study that this
operational definition is referred to as A-15. The issue with tracking A-15 was that
much information regarding flights that were delayed from their scheduled arrival
time, however, were delayed less than 15 minutes do not appear in the statistics
tracked by Transtats Tool-B. A superior tracker would have allowed for records to
be collected on arrival delays different than scheduled arrival time in greater than
zero minutes (A zero). Fortunately, such a tracker could be located.
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The Transtats Carrier On-Time Performance Database, which will be
referred to as Transtats Tool-A from hence forth, allowed for massive
customization with regard to data retrieval. Transtats Tool-A allowed not only for
A-zero delays to be tracked, but also for other categorical items of importance to
this study to be tracked as well, such as day of week that a delay occurred, and
exact time of day. Each delay listed in Transtats Tool-A was also attached to a
specific flight number, easily allowing for the validation of any particular data
point within its archives.
Sample
All dependent variable data was collected via official United States
Government archives in order to ensure the integrity and validity of any data used.
Specifically, Transtats Tool-A was used for collection of Part 121 arrival delay data
into MCO. The sampling strategy for this analysis was random. Random sampling
was appropriate given the large volume of data available from Transtats Tool-A
relative to the required sample sizes of each research question. In order to allow for
adequate sample data to be collected, the most recently-available ten months of
data from Transtats Tool-A at time of study commencement was drawn, and subsamples for each research question were drawn using a random number generator.
Only delays coded as due to “Volume,” “Other,” or uncoded by Transtats Tool-A
were used as sample data for this study.
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Power Analysis
A-priori minimum sample size calculations were performed using G*Power
version 3.1 for each research question, and the following information was
produced:
1. The minimum sample size calculation for the One-Way ANOVA to be
performed to evaluate RQ1 was found to be n = 128. In order to arrive
at this computation, a medium effect size of .25 was assumed, a power
of .8 was input as desired, and an alpha of a = .05 was listed. The
specific results of this computation are listed within Appendix A.
2.

The minimum sample size calculation for the 2 x 7 Factorial ANOVA
to be performed to evaluate RQ2 was found to be n = 158. In order to
arrive at this computation, a medium effect size of .25 was assumed, a
power of .8 was input as desired, and an alpha of a = .05 was listed. The
specific results of this computation are listed within Appendix A.

3.

The minimum sample size calculation for the 2 x 6 Factorial ANOVA
to be performed to evaluate RQ3 was found to be n = 158. In order to
arrive at this computation, a medium effect size of .25 was assumed, a
power of .8 was input as desired, and an alpha of a = .05 was listed. The
specific results of this computation are listed within Appendix A.
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Instrumentation
Instrument Validity and Reliability/Data Integrity
No data collection instrument, such as a survey, was utilized by this study.
In order to ensure the integrity of all data sources used, only official United States
government databases were used to collect dependent variable data. Dependent
variable data was synthesized from data obtained using Transtats Tool-A.
In the case of independent variable data, specific past orbital launch dates
were readily available from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), however,
specific launch times proved challenging to collect from this source. Therefore,
unless an alternate official government source of this information was found, no
less than two non-government database sources were used to collect specific Cape
Canaveral orbital launch times, with the two sources being compared to each other
for accuracy of reported launch time data. In the event that there was a discrepancy
between the two non-government sources of specific launch time, such that the
boundary of two time categories was straddled, a third tie-breaker source was used
to determine the exact time of the launch in question. If the consultation of the third
source still failed to clarify what categorical level of time period the launch in
question belongs in, then said launch was removed from consideration under this
analysis.
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Weather as a Confounder
There was potential for severe weather delays to impact a study located in
central Florida. While it is conceivable that any weather-related delay strong
enough to cause arrival delays into MCO would also result in cancellation of an
orbital space launch at nearby Cape Canaveral, any delay generated during the
active launch window of said launch attempt would have been of interest to this
study. Fortunately, Transtats Tool-A codified delay reason by cause, and any delay
coded as due to weather was removed from consideration of this study. For
tracking purposes, the amount of data points removed due to this conflict was
reported as Appendix C.
Procedures
Research Methodology
The research methodology to be used for this analysis was quantitative,
associational research. The selected research sub-design was ex post facto, effects
type. Quantitative research was the appropriate methodology to be used in this
analysis due to the need for all preliminary research questions to be addressed using
inferential statistical analysis. A qualitative approach would have failed to address
any of the preliminary research questions properly, therefore the use of either a
qualitative or a mixed-methods approach could be wholly excluded from
consideration here. Likewise, associational research was appropriate due to the lack
of any intervention within this study, thus excluding experimental research from
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consideration. Further, the direct need for inferential statistics to be used to address
the research questions excluded the possibility of using descriptive research.
The ex post facto design was necessary due to the fact that group
differences were being measured, with each group and its corresponding dependent
variable data being pre-existing. The use of a correlational design, associational
research’s other arm, was inappropriate because this study was not examining a
relationship within a single group. The effects-type sub design was appropriate due
to the fact that the group membership variable was located on the independent
variable group for all research questions.
Human Subjects Research
No human subjects or personal identifying data were used in this analysis.
Only US government archival data lacking any reference to individuals was
analyzed. Thus, the Florida Tech IRB was consulted on this study, however, this
study fell under the “exempt” category.
Description of Independent and Dependent Variables
Dependent Variable. The dependent variable that was used within all three
research questions was the continuous value of average arrival delay in minutes
different than scheduled (a-zero) of Part 121 air carrier traffic into MCO. In the
cases of RQ1 and RQ2, the average delay figure was measured across the time
parameter of a full day. In the case of RQ3, the average delay figure was measured
across the time parameter of the respective time period being compared by the
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respective independent variable value. For example, within RQ3 a time period of
0000 – 0359 local MCO time was compared, thus, the average arrival delay value
was the average calculated delay that occurred between 0000 – 0359.
Independent Variable. There are multiple independent variables that were
used within this study. The independent variable that acted as the row variable for
all three RQs was the dichotomous categorical value of launch or no launch. If an
orbital space launch, as operationally defined within Chapter 1 of this study,
occurred on a particular day or during a particular time period, then a value of
“launch” was assigned. If no such orbital launch occurred during the time period
being compared than a value of “no launch” was assigned.
The secondary independent variables varied between individual RQs, and
are explained in detail below:
1. RQ1 did not utilize a secondary independent variable.
2. RQ2 utilized a column independent variable referred to as “day of
week.” Day of week was defined as the seven-level categorical
value of Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday,
Friday, or Saturday.
3. RQ3 utilized a column independent variable referred to as “time of
day.” Time of day was defined as the six-level categorical value of
four hour time period measured from 0000-0000 local MCO/Cape
Canaveral time (Eastern Time). The six levels of time of day were
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0000 – 0359 (Period 1), 0400 – 0759 (Period 2), 0800 – 1159
(Period 3), 1200 – 1559 (Period 4), 1600 – 1959 (Period 5), and
2000 – 2359 (Period 6).
Study Implementation
Initial dependent variable sample data was drawn from Transtats Tool-A via
electronic download. The web address for the access portal to Transtats Tool-A is
https://www.transtats.bts.gov/DL_SelectFields.asp?gnoyr_VQ=FGK&QO
_fu146_anzr=b0-gvzr. The data from Transtats Tool-A defaulted into an excel
spreadsheet format that contained both the information desired for use within this
study and also undesired pieces of information such as carrier code, and arrival
delays into airports other than MCO. Only delays coded as “Volume,” “Other,” or
uncoded were used as sample data. Given that data was available on a month-tomonth basis, ten downloads (one per month of desired data) were made. Original
and unaltered copies of these spreadsheets were retained and will be stored by the
researcher for no less than 24 months following the conclusion and defense of the
study’s results.
Once all downloads had been completed and original copies of said
downloads preserved for future reference, data were condensed by removing
extraneous and unsought data entries from each spreadsheet. Data from each month
was then reviewed, both separately and combined, using appropriate descriptive
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statistics in a manner detailed below in the descriptive statistics section of this
chapter.
Independent variable data regarding launch dates and times were obtained
primarily from the FAA’s launch license portal at https://www.faa.gov/data
_research/commercial_space_data/launches/?type=Licensed. This information was
broken down in a separate spreadsheet page into sub-categories on days of the
week and time period in which each respective launch occurred. Appropriate
descriptive products were then produced, which are detailed in the Descriptive
Statistics section of this chapter. Once all appropriate data synthesis and descriptive
analysis had been completed, inferential analysis of each research question began.
All inferential computations were be made using SPSS Version 28.
RQ1 was evaluated using the one-way ANOVA. In the event that the
collected data did not meet the assumptions for the one-way ANOVA, the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis Test would have been used instead. RQ1 had a
continuous dependent variable, average Part 121 arrival delay in minutes, and a
dichotomous categorical independent variable, the categories of launch or no
launch. If for some reason neither the One-Way ANOVA nor the Kruskal Wallis
Test were found appropriate, the independent-means t-test would also have been
appropriate to evaluate RQ1 inferentially.
RQ2 was evaluated using the two-way factorial ANOVA. In the event that
the collected data did not meet the assumptions for the two-way ANOVA, the non-
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parametric Kruskal-Wallis Test was to be used in series by factor instead. RQ2 had
a continuous dependent variable, average Part 121 arrival delay in minutes, and two
multi-level categorical independent variables: the dichotomous category of launch
or no launch, and the seven-level category of day of week.
RQ3 was evaluated using the two-way factorial ANOVA. In the event that
the collected data did not meet the assumptions for the two-way ANOVA, the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis Test would have been used in series by factor instead.
RQ3 had a continuous dependent variable, average Part 121 arrival delay in
minutes, and two multi-level categorical independent variables: the dichotomous
category of launch or no launch, and the six-level category of time of day.
Upon completion of inferential computations, data was analyzed by the
researcher into written and graphical findings. The findings of RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3
will be used to generate an ideal sequence model for orbital launch slot assignments
by both day of week and time period that allows for both maximum annual space
launches and minimal delay impact to Part 121 arrivals into MCO. Discussion of
the findings was compared and contrasted to the findings of existing literature
surveyed in Chapter 2 of this study, and written conclusions followed based off of
this action. Finally, recommendations for industry practice and future academic
research into this area were made.
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Threats to Internal Validity
1. Location: The ex post facto design is typically vulnerable to the location
threat; however, the researcher controlled for this threat by choosing to
analyze data from only a single location. Likewise, all dependent variable
data was downloaded from a single archival source. Therefore, the effects
of the location threat with regard to this study were controlled for.
2. Instrument: The ex post facto design is also typically vulnerable to the
instrument threat. In this case, no instrument was used for data collection,
therefore this threat was no factor.
3. Mortality: Despite the use of official U.S. Government archival records,
there was a two-fold mortality threat present in this study: The threat of data
loss due to poor handling by the record’s custodians prior to download by
the researcher, and the threat of data loss due to poor handling by the
researcher following the initial data download. The threat of data loss due to
poor handling by its custodians was outside of the researcher’s control and
was accepted and listed as a limitation of the study. The risk of data loss
due to poor handling by the researcher during data coalescence and
synthesis was controlled for by saving backup copies of all work done
(including original spreadsheet downloads), and only electronic calculators
or similar programs were used to conduct all mathematic calculations. To
the extent possible, the mortality threat to this study was controlled for.
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4. History: There was a significant history threat present to this study and that
is the effect of Covid-19 on passenger air travel in the United States. While
passenger travel, and thus the number of Part 121 flights, did dramatically
decline starting in March of 2020, at present day the TSA reports that the
number of passengers screened on some days is already exceeding peak
2019 levels (Transportation Security Administration, 2021). While the
effects of Covid resulted in a relatively reduced accessible population, it is
highly doubtful that Covid could be used to explain any observed effect
between Part 121 arrival delays into MCO and orbital space launches at
Cape Canaveral. Therefore, the researcher accepted the possible effects of
the history threat and will list the potential effects of Covid on the number
of Part 121 flights as a study limitation.
Treatment Verification and Fidelity
This analysis utilized an ex post facto design. Therefore, there was no
researcher-manipulated independent variable. Likewise, the ex post facto design
prevented any causal relationship from being established between the independent
variable and dependent variable. In layman’s terms: there was no treatment being
examined by this research, and therefore this topic was not a factor.
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Data Analysis
Descriptive Statistics
Initially collected data was used for descriptive analysis both separately
and in combined formats. Mean, median, mode and variance sample summary data
was computed and reported in both written and tabular form as appropriate for
dependent variable data. Tables 1 and 2 below illustrate some examples of the
descriptive products that were produced by this analysis; however, more were also
added as appropriate. Mode data was computed for independent variable data.
Table 3, below, illustrates what this descriptive product looks like.
Table 3.1
Summary of MCO A0 and A15 Delays by Air Carrier

Delay Type
A-Zero
Air Carrier

N

%

A-15
N

%

Overall
N

Endeavor Air
American Airlines
Delta Air Lines
Hawaiian Airlines
Southwest Airlines
United Airlines
Republic Airways
Spirit Airlines
Frontier Airways
JetBlue Airways
Alaska Airlines
Total
Note. N = X.
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%

Table 3.2
Summary of Part 121
Arrival Delays by
Cause

Status

N

%

Weather
Volume
Other
Equipment
Closure
Total
Note. N = X.

Table 3.3
Orbital Space Launches by Day of Week and Time of Day

Time of Daya
1

2

3

4

5

6

Day of Week
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
Saturday
Sunday
Total
Note. N = X.

Inferential Statistics
All appropriate assumption tests were completed and either verified or
nullified prior to the commencement of any inferential statistical tests. Evidence of
the sample data’s compliance with the various assumptions of each RQ’s respective
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inferential statistical test was attached as Appendix B or otherwise detailed in
Chapter 4. All alpha values, degrees of freedom, and F-statistics were provided as
summary data. Likewise, the results of all post hoc tests, including pairwise
comparisons (if appropriate), power, and effect size were provided.
RQ1 was evaluated using the one-way ANOVA. In the event that the
collected data did not meet the assumptions for the one-way ANOVA, the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis Test would have been used instead. The test statistic
used was the F-statistic. This inferential statistical method is appropriate due to the
fact that group differences are being compared for statistical significance. RQ1 had
a continuous dependent variable, average Part 121 arrival delay in minutes, and a
dichotomous categorical independent variable, the categories of launch or no
launch. If for some reason neither the One-Way ANOVA nor the Kruskal Wallis
Test were found appropriate, the independent-means t-test would also have been
appropriate to evaluate RQ1 inferentially.
Research Hypothesis: There was a significant difference in average Part 121
flight delays into MCO between days that an orbital space launch occurred,
and days that one did not.
Null Hypothesis: There was no difference in average Part 121 flight delays
into MCO between days that an orbital space launch occurred, and days that
one did not.
Ho: μ1 = μ2
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H1: μ1 ≠ μ2
RQ2 was evaluated using the two-way factorial ANOVA. In the event that
the collected data did not meet the assumptions for the two-way ANOVA, the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis Test would have used in series instead by factor. The
test statistic used was the F-statistic. This inferential statistical method was
appropriate due to the fact that group differences were being compared for
statistical significance across multiple factors. Further, this RQ had a continuous
dependent variable, average Part 121 arrival delay in minutes, and two multi-level
categorical independent variables: the category of launch or no launch, and the
seven-level category of day of week. An example of what this ANOVA design
looked like is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Research Hypothesis: There was a significant difference in average Part 121
flight delays into MCO between days that an orbital space launch occurred,
and days that one did not, with respect to day of week.
Null Hypothesis, First Main Effect: There was no significant difference on
Part 121 arrival delays into MCO based on whether or not an orbital space
launch occurred at Cape Canaveral.
Null Hypothesis, Second Main Effect: There was no significant difference
on Part 121 arrival delays into MCO with respect to the Day of Week in
which a delay occurred.
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Null Hypothesis, Interaction Effect: There was no significant interaction
effect between whether an orbital space launch occurred at Cape Canaveral,
and the Day of Week in which a launch occurred, in terms of Part 121
arrival delays into MCO.
Ho1: μ1 = μ2
Ho2: μ1 = μ2 = μ3… = μ7
Ho3: No interaction was present.

2 x 7 Design
Day
of
Week

Launch or No Launch?
Launch

No Launch

Monday

21.92

25.75

Tuesday

21.92

20.59

Wednesday

36.25

26.92

Thursday

23.08

30.5

Friday

54.75

10.42

Saturday

20.84

9.42

Sunday

17.92

45.95

Figure 3.2. 2 x 7 Factorial ANOVA Design
Note. All values in minutes.
RQ3 was evaluated using the two-way ANOVA. In the event that the
collected data did not meet the assumptions for the two-way ANOVA, the non65

parametric Kruskal-Wallis Test would have been used instead. The test statistic
was the F-statistic. This inferential statistical method was appropriate due to the
fact that group differences were being compared for statistical significance. Further,
this RQ had a continuous dependent variable, average Part 121 arrival delay in
minutes, and two multi-level categorical independent variables: the category of
launch or no launch, and the six-level category of time of day. Time of day for this
RQ was partitioned into six, four-hour long periods. An example of what this
ANOVA design looked like is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Research Hypothesis: There was a significant difference in average Part 121
flight delays into MCO between days that an orbital space launch occurred,
and days that one did not, with respect to time of day.
Null Hypothesis, First Main Effect: There was no significant difference on
Part 121 arrival delays into MCO based on whether or not an orbital space
launch occurred at Cape Canaveral.
Null Hypothesis, Second Main Effect: There was no significant difference
on Part 121 arrival delays into MCO with respect to the Time of Day in
which a delay occurred.
Null Hypothesis, Interaction Effect: There was no significant interaction
effect between whether an orbital space launch occurred at Cape Canaveral,
and the Time of Day in which a launch occurred, in terms of Part 121
arrival delays into MCO.
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Ho1: μ1 = μ2
Ho2: μ1 = μ2 = μ3… = μ6
Ho3: No interaction was present.

2 x 6 Design
Time
of
Day

Launch or No Launch?
Launch

No Launch

1

32.93

43.72

2

17

16.07

3

9.22

21.29

4

10

14.5

5

13.22

38.36

6

39.14

14.93

Figure 3.3. 2 x 6 Factorial ANOVA Design
Note. All values in minutes.
Foreword on Results Section
Using the details outlined in Chapter 3, available data was drawn,
organized, and evaluated both descriptively and inferentially. The details of this
process and the proceeding analysis are listed below as Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
Results
Descriptive Statistics of Sample Data
Independent Variable
The primary independent variable for all research questions within this
study was the categorized value of days and times that orbital space launches
occurred. According to the official archival sources outlined in Chapter 3, N = 33
orbital space launches occurred from Cape Canaveral during the ten month time
period established by the study. When categorized by day of week and time of day
in which said orbital space launches occurred, a mode of Mo = Thursday and
Sunday were found when considering the category of Day of Week for launches,
and a mode of Mo = Period 4 (1200-1559) was identified when considering the
category of Time of Day. This information is illustrated below, in Table 4.1.
While not directly connected to the research questions at hand, it is of note
that of the n = 33 launches that were recorded and used by this study, the SpaceX
Falcon 9 rocket accounted for the vehicle used in 30 of these launches (90.9%), the
United Launch Alliance (ULA) Atlas 5 accounted for 2 launches (6.06%), and the
ULA Delta 4 Heavy accounted for just a single launch (3.03%). Figure 4.1 serves
to give some idea on which operator/vehicle is responsible for the lion’s share of
recent orbital space launch operations from Cape Canaveral.
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Table 4.1
Orbital Space Launches by Day of Week and Time of Day

Time of Day
1

2

3

4

Day of Week
Monday

0

0

0

0

Tuesday

0

1

0

Wednesday

0

1

Thursday

3

Friday

5

6

Total

0

1

1

2

0

1

4

1

3

0

1

6

0

1

2

1

2

9

0

1

0

0

1

0

2

Saturday

0

0

2

0

1

0

3

Sunday

2

1

3

1

1

0

9

Total

5

4

7

8

4

5

33

Note. N = 33 launches.

Launch Vehicle

Falcon 9

Atlas 5

Delta 4 Heavy

Figure 4.1. Breakdown of Launch Vehicles Used During Measured Time Period
Note. N = 33 total observed launch events.
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Dependent Variable
Overall
The dependent variable used across all three primary research questions in
this study was the value of flight delay in minutes. From the study’s established
time period of September 2020 to June 2021 (inclusive), a total of N = 22,783
usable arrival delays were recorded by Transtats Tool A. In order to arrive at this
sample of usable delays some data entries that were incomplete, such as those
marked as delayed but with no recorded time value for said delay, were culled from
the sample. Likewise, delays in which the majority of the time was coded as caused
by security, late arriving aircraft at origin, or due to weather were also removed
from the sample. As a result of these endeavors, 324 delays were removed from the
sample due to being coded as caused by weather, 63 were removed due to being
coded as caused by security, 3,659 were removed due to being coded as caused by
late arrival of aircraft at the flight’s point of departure, and 1,195 were removed due
to a lack of recorded delay value (missing a-zero). Thus, a total of 5,241 delays
were removed from the sample per the guidelines established in Chapter 3, leaving
a total sample of N = 22,783 flights available for analysis. A month-by-month
tabulation of the number of flights deleted in each category is listed below, as
Appendix C. Further, a database of all specific delays that were used and deleted
has been retained by the author per the guidance outlined in Chapter 3.
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A-priori sample size calculations for all three primary research questions
yielded appropriate sample sizes of less than N = 200 delays (See Appendix A),
while the available sample from Transtats Tool-A was over 22,000 delays. To use
the entire available sample of delays would be cause for concern in the results with
regard to central limit theorem, therefore, the decision was made to partition each
group of usable delays by category, and then to randomly select samples of
appropriate size (as defined by the a-priori calculations presented in Appendix A)
for each RQ using a random number generator as described in Chapter 3. All data
points selected by this process for inclusion have been retained by the author per
the guidance in Chapter 3.
Flight Frequency by Category
It is important to define the total number of flights recorded as arriving into
MCO during the study’s established time period, with respect to both the category
of day of week as well as the category of time of day. This consideration is
important because it will allow for delay frequency data to be converted to
proportional data, which will be inherently more useful for the considerations made
within the contents of Chapter 5. This information is listed below, in Table 4.2 and
Table 4.3.
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Table 4.2
Summary of Part 121
Arrivals by Day of
Week

N

%

Monday

13,516

14.98

Tuesday

11,370

12.60

Wednesday

11,480

12.72

Thursday

12,965

14.37

Friday

13,268

14.70

Saturday

13,913

15.42

Sunday

13,725

15.21

Day

Total

90,237

100.00

Note. N = 90,237.

Table 4.3
Summary of Part 121
Arrivals by Time of
Day

N

%

Period 1

2,219

2.48

Period 2

2,891

3.24

Period 3

20,215

22.64

Period 4

22,189

24.85

Period 5

23,522

26.34

Period 6

18,268

20.46

Time

Total

89,304

100.00

Note. N = 90,237 but 933 database entries were
missing arrival time information. All percents
are based off of N = 89,304 recorded arrrival
times.
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RQ1
RQ1 utilized a random sample of N = 128 flight delays. This resulted in 64
delays being selected from the group of delays that occurred on launch days, and 64
delays being selected from the group of delays that occurred on non-launch days.
From the overall data pool drawn from Transtats Tool-A, 2,302 arrival
delays occurred during the 33 launch days for an average of M = 69.76 delays per
launch day. Likewise, 20,482 arrival delays were recorded during the 302 nonlaunch days observed by the study, for an average of M = 67.82 delays per nonlaunch day. Thus, in terms of frequency, a higher overall number of delays was
observed on days in which an orbital space launch occurred, compared to the
number of delays observed on days in which no orbital space launch occurred.
Of the sample of N = 128 arrival delays selected for use in RQ1, a mean of
M = 26.82 minutes was found across the total sample, with the launch category
yielding an average delay of M = 26.03 minutes, and the no launch category
yielding an average arrival delay of M = 27.61 minutes. The sample’s overall
standard deviation was found to be SD = 56.87 minutes, with the launch category
yielding a standard deviation of SD = 53.78 minutes, and the no launch category
yielding a standard deviation of SD = 60.22 minutes. The overall range of the
sample was (1 – 446 minutes), the launch category range was (1 – 404 minutes),
and the no launch category range was (1 – 446 minutes). This information is
presented further in Table 4.4, below.
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Table 4.4
RQ1 Descriptive Statistics Summary

No Launch

N
64

Mean
27.61

SD
60.22

SE
7.53

Lower 95%
12.57

Launch

64

26.03

53.78

6.72

12.60

Total

128

26.82

56.87

5.03

16.87

Upper 95%
42.65

Min
1.00

Max
446.00

39.47

1.00

404.00

36.77

1.00

446.00

Note. N = 128. All figures rounded to two decimal places.

Referencing Table 4.4, it is immediately seen that the average delay on a
day in which no orbital space launch occurred was 1.58 minutes longer than the
average delay on a day in which a space launch occurred. Likewise, the launch
category recorded a maximum delay of 404 minutes, whereas the no launch
category recorded a maximum value of 446 minutes, which is 42 minutes longer
than the maximum value recorded by the launch category (10.40%).
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Figure 4.2. Distribution of RQ1 Sample Data
Figure 4.2, above, illustrates the distribution of recorded delays measured
by RQ1. It is of note that the distribution displays approximately normal kurtosis
(mesokurtic), however, the distribution is clearly skewed right. This skew is likely
driven by the presence of two extreme scores (one per category) and the relatively
low total sample mode of Mo = 1 and 3. The normality of RQ1’s sample
distribution was tested and reported in the Inferential Statistics section, below.
RQ2
RQ2 utilized a random sample of N = 168 arrival delays, of which 84 delays
were drawn from the category of launch, and 84 delays were drawn from the
category of no launch. Further, 24 delays were drawn from each day within the
category of day of week (Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday,
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Saturday, and Sunday) for a final subset of 12 arrival delays per specific category
(such as Monday, launch).
From the overall data pool drawn from Transtats Tool-A, 2,302 arrival
delays occurred during the 33 launch days for an average of M = 69.76 delays per
launch day. Likewise, 20,482 arrival delays were recorded during the 302 nonlaunch days observed by the study, for an average of M = 67.82 delays per nonlaunch day. Thus, in terms of frequency, a higher overall number of delays was
observed on days in which an orbital space launch occurred, compared to the
number of delays observed on days in which no orbital space launch occurred.
Across the category of day of week, it was found that delays on Mondays
occurred at an average frequency of M = 139.00 per day on days in which launches
occurred, compared to an average of M = 72.12 delays on Mondays in which no
launch occurred. On Tuesdays it was found that an average of M = 58.75 arrival
delays occurred on days that a launch occurred compared to M = 51.32 average
delays on days that no launch occurred. On Wednesdays an average of M = 77.67
arrival delays occurred on days that a launch occurred, compared to an average of
M = 48.23 delays on days that no such launch occurred. On Thursdays, an average
of M = 62.89 delays occurred on days that a launch occurred, with M = 67.72
average delays occurring on days that no launch occurred. On Fridays, an average
of M = 43.00 arrival delays occurred per day that a launch occurred, compared to
an average of M = 75.28 delays on days that no launch occurred. On Saturdays,
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launch days saw an average of M = 75.00 arrival delays, while no launch days saw
an average of M = 80.21 delays. Finally, Sundays saw an average of M = 72.38
arrival delays per launch day, compared to M = 76.86 average arrival delays on no
launch days. This information is depicted graphically as Table 4.5.
Table 4.5
RQ2 Frequency Data

Day

Launch

Monday

139.00

No Launch
72.12

Tuesday

58.75

51.32

Wednesday

77.67

48.23

Thursday

62.89

67.72

Friday

43.00

75.28

Saturday

75.00

80.21

Sunday

72.38

76.86

Note. Frequency data is presented in average
number of delays per category.

Of the sample of N = 168 arrival delays selected for use in RQ2, a mean of
M = 26.15 minutes was found across the total sample, with the launch category
yielding an average delay of M = 28.10 minutes, and the no launch category
yielding an average arrival delay of M = 24.21 minutes. Across the category of day
of week, Mondays saw an average delay of M = 23.83 minutes, Tuesdays saw an
average delay of M = 21.25 minutes, Wednesdays saw an average delay of M =
31.58 minutes, Thursdays saw an average delay of M = 26.79 minutes, Fridays saw
an average delay of M = 32.58 minutes, Saturdays saw an average delay of M =
15.13 minutes, and Sundays saw an average delay of M = 31.92 minutes. Thus,
ordering of the day of week category from greatest to least average arrival delay by
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day yields an order of Friday, Sunday, Wednesday, Thursday, Monday, Tuesday,
and Saturday. This ordering is revisited and explored further in Chapter 5.
RQ2’s sample had an overall standard deviation of SD = 37.32 minutes,
with the launch category yielding a standard deviation of SD = 40.01 minutes, and
the no launch category yielding a standard deviation of SD = 34.54 minutes. The
overall range of the sample was (1 – 305 minutes). Information on the standard
deviation values of the day of week category, as well as mean values for day of
week considering the category of launch or no launch, are presented below, as
Table 4.6.

78

Table 4.6
RQ2 Descriptive Statistics Summary

Launch Status
No Launch

Launch

Total

Day of Week

N

Mean

SD

Monday

12

25.75

29.84

Tuesday

12

20.58

23.85

Wednesday

12

26.91

47.34

Thursday

12

30.50

50.20

Friday

12

10.42

13.14

Saturday

12

9.42

6.91

Sunday

12

45.92

39.15

Total

84

24.21

34.54

Monday

12

21.92

17.21

Tuesday

12

21.92

23.60

Wednesday

12

36.25

29.66

Thursday

12

23.08

26.18

Friday

12

54.75

87.20

Saturday

12

20.83

26.47

Sunday

12

17.92

15.13

Total

84

28.10

40.01

Monday

24

23.83

23.91

Tuesday

24

21.25

23.21

Wednesday

24

31.58

38.93

Thursday

24

26.79

39.33

Friday

24

32.58

65.06

Saturday

24

15.13

19.80

Sunday

24

31.92

32.36

Total

168

26.15

37.32

Note. N = 168. All figures rounded to two decimal places.

Referencing Table 4.6, the average delay on a day in which no orbital space
launch occurred was 3.89 minutes shorter than the average delay on a day in which
a space launch occurred. Across the category of day of week; Tuesday, Wednesday,
Friday and Saturday saw longer average delays on launch days compared to no
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launch days, whereas Monday, Thursday and Sunday saw shorter average delays on
launch days compared to no launch days.

Figure 4.3. Distribution of RQ2 Sample Data
Figure 4.3, above, illustrates the distribution of recorded delays measured
by RQ2. It is of note that the distribution displays approximately normal kurtosis
(mesokurtic), however, the distribution is clearly skewed right. This skew is likely
driven by the presence of three extreme scores and the relatively low total sample
mode of Mo = 1. The normality of RQ2’s sample distribution was tested and
reported in the Inferential Statistics section, below.
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RQ3
RQ3 utilized a random sample of N = 168 arrival delays, of which 84 delays
were drawn from the category of launch, and 84 delays were drawn from the
category of no launch. Further, 28 delays were drawn from each day within the
category of time of day (0000-0359, 0400-0759, 0800-1159, 1200-1559, 16001959, and 2000-2359) for a final subset of 14 arrival delays per specific category
(such as 0000-0359, launch).
From the overall data pool drawn from Transtats Tool-A, 2,302 arrival
delays occurred during the 33 launch days for an average of M = 69.76 delays per
launch day. Likewise, 20,482 arrival delays were recorded during the 302 nonlaunch days observed by the study, for an average of M = 67.82 delays per nonlaunch day. Thus, in terms of frequency, a higher overall number of delays was
observed on days in which an orbital space launch occurred, compared to the
number of delays observed on days in which no orbital space launch occurred.
Across the category of time of day, it was found that delays during 00000359 occurred at an average frequency of M = 5.25 per day on days in which
launches occurred, compared to an average of M = 3.10 delays during the same
time period on days that no launch occurred. From 0400-0759 it was found that an
average of 4.00 arrival delays occurred on days that a launch occurred compared to
2.02 average delays on days that no launch occurred. From 0800-1159, an average
of M = 9.43 arrival delays occurred on days that a launch occurred, compared to an
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average of M = 13.00 delays on days that no such launch occurred. From 12001559, an average of M = 21.14 delays occurred on days that a launch occurred, with
M = 18.03 average delays occurring on days that no launch occurred. From 16001959, an average of M = 26.00 arrival delays occurred per day that a launch
occurred, compared to an average of M = 21.14 delays on days that no launch
occurred. From 2000-2359, launch days saw an average of M = 12.00 arrival
delays, while no launch days saw an average of M = 16.73 delays. This information
is depicted graphically as Table 4.7.
Table 4.7
RQ3 Frequency Data

Launch

Time

No Launch

Period 1

5.25

3.10

Period 2

4.00

2.02

Period 3

9.43

13.00

Period 4

21.14

18.03

Period 5

26.00

21.14

Period 6

12.00

16.73

Note. Frequency data is presented in
average number of delays per category.

Of the sample of N = 168 arrival delays selected for use in RQ3, a mean of
M = 22.53 minutes was found across the total sample, with the launch category
yielding an average delay of M = 20.25 minutes, and the no launch category
yielding an average arrival delay of M = 24.81 minutes. Across the category of
time of day, 0000-0359 saw an average delay of M = 38.32 minutes, 0400-0759
saw an average delay of M = 16.54 minutes, 0800-1159 saw an average delay of M
= 15.25 minutes, 1200-1559 saw an average delay of M = 12.25 minutes, 160082

1959 saw an average delay of M = 25.79 minutes, and 2000-2359 saw an average
delay of M = 27.04 minutes. Thus, ordering of the time of day category from
greatest to least average arrival delay by day yields an order of 0000-0359 (period
1), 2000-2359 (period 6), 1600-1959 (period 5), 0400-0759 (period 2), 0800-1159
(period 3), and 1200-1559 (period 4). This ordering is revisited and explored
further in Chapter 5.
RQ3’s sample had an overall standard deviation of SD = 37.32 minutes,
with the launch category yielding a standard deviation of SD = 33.26 minutes, and
the no launch category yielding a standard deviation of SD = 39.53 minutes. The
overall range of the sample was (1 – 296 minutes). Information on the standard
deviation values of the time of day category, as well as mean values for time of day
considering the category of launch or no launch, are presented below, as Table 4.8.

83

Table 4.8
RQ3 Descriptive Statistics Summary

Launch Status
No Launch

Launch

Total

Time of Day

N

Mean

SD

Period 1

14

43.71

37.11

Period 2

14

16.07

23.59

Period 3

14

21.29

26.47

Period 4

14

14.50

11.53

Period 5

14

38.36

78.08

Period 6

14

14.93

14.66

Total

84

24.81

39.53

Period 1

14

32.93

33.53

Period 2

14

17.00

16.62

Period 3

14

9.21

9.65

Period 4

14

10.00

8.14

Period 5

14

13.21

12.38

Period 6

14

39.14

66.96

Total

84

20.25

33.26

Period 1

28

38.32

35.14

Period 2

28

16.54

20.04

Period 3

28

15.25

20.49

Period 4

28

12.25

10.06

Period 5

28

25.79

56.33

Period 6

28

27.04

49.13

Total

168

22.53

36.49

Note. N = 168. All figures rounded to two decimal places.

Referencing Table 4.8, the average delay on a day in which no orbital space
launch occurred was 4.56 minutes shorter than the average delay on a day in which
a space launch occurred. Across the category of time of day; period 2 and period 6
saw longer average delays on launch days compared to no launch days, whereas all
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other time periods saw shorter average delays on launch days compared to nonlaunch days.

Figure 4.4. RQ3 Sample Distribution
Figure 4.4, above, illustrates the distribution of recorded delays measured
by RQ3. It is of note that the distribution displays approximately normal kurtosis
(mesokurtic), however, the distribution is clearly skewed right. This skew is likely
driven by the presence of two extreme scores and the relatively low total sample
mode of Mo = 1 and 2. The normality of RQ3’s sample distribution was tested and
reported in the Inferential Statistics section, below.
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Inferential Statistics
RQ1
RQ1 was inferentially evaluated using the one-way ANOVA hypothesis
test. Due to the selection of the ANOVA, the appropriate test statistic is the F
statistic. Given the sample size of N = 128, and the number of groups of G = 2, the
numerator degrees of freedom (df) is found as df = 1, and the denominator df is
found as df = 127. Utilizing the alpha value established in Chapter 3 of a = .05, a
critical value of Fcrit = 3.916 is found.
Assumptions
The one-way ANOVA has three assumptions: independence, normality, and
equal variance. The independence assumption of the one-way ANOVA was
complied with automatically due to the sample for RQ1 being randomly selected.
In order to assess the normality of RQ1’s distribution a Q-Q plot was constructed;
this plot is depicted below as Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5, RQ1 Q-Q Plot
Referencing Figure 4.5, the sample distribution for RQ1 displays a
moderate violation of the normality assumption. However, given that RQ1 used a
robust sample size (N > 30), this violation is acceptable.
The equal variances assumption was tested for RQ1 via the Levene Test,
which yielded a value of p = .798. This value is greater than RQ1’s significance of
a = .05, therefore the equal variances assumption is complied with. Thus, any
significant differences between groups found by the ANOVA must be due to
unequal means rather than unequal variances.
Findings
Referencing Table 4.9, below, the one-way ANOVA found that there was
no significant difference in MCO Part 121 arrival delays between days that an
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orbital space launch occurred from Cape Canaveral F(1, 127) = .024, p = .876.
Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for RQ1.
Table 4.9
RQ1 ANOVA Summary

Sum of Squares
Between Groups

79.695

df

Mean Square

1

79.695
3259.485

Within Groups

410695.172

126

Total

410774.867

127

F
.024

Sig.
.876

Note. N = 128. All figures rounded to three decimal places.

Post Hoc
A post hoc partial eta squared of η2 < 0.01 was computed, meaning that less
than 1% of the variance in arrival delays into MCO are attributable to differences
between the two group means. A post hoc power of 1−β = .876 was computed, an
objectively high power.
RQ2
RQ2 was inferentially evaluated using the two-way ANOVA hypothesis
test. Due to the selection of the ANOVA, the appropriate test statistic is the F
statistic. Given the sample size of N = 168, an alpha value of a = .05, and the
number of groups of G = 14, the following degrees of freedom and critical values
are found: The main effect of launch had a degrees of freedom of df = (1, 154) and
therefore the critical value for the main effect of launch is found as Fcrit = 3.903.
The main effect of day of week had a degrees of freedom of df = (6, 154) and
therefore a critical value of Fcrit = 2.158. The interaction of launch with day of
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week had a degrees of freedom of df = (6, 154) and therefore a critical value of
Fcrit = 2.158.
Assumptions
The two-way ANOVA has three assumptions: independence, normality, and
equal variance. The independence assumption of the two-way ANOVA was
complied with automatically due to the sample for RQ2 being randomly selected.
In order to assess the normality of RQ2’s distribution a Q-Q plot was constructed;
this plot is depicted below as Figure 4.6.

Figure 4.6. Q-Q Plot of RQ2 Sample Data
Referencing Figure 4.6, the sample distribution for RQ2 displays a
moderate violation of the normality assumption. However, given that RQ2 used a
robust sample size (N > 30), this violation is acceptable.
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The equal variances assumption was tested for RQ2 via the Levene Test,
which yielded a value of p = .430. This value is greater than RQ2’s significance of
a = .05, therefore the equal variances assumption is complied with. Thus, any
significant differences between groups found by the ANOVA could not be due to
unequal variances between groups.
Findings
Table 4.10
RQ2 ANOVA Summary

Source

Sum Of
Squares

Launch

632.60

1

632.560

.468

.495

Day of Week

6132.06

6

1022.01

.756

.606

Interaction

17597.66

6

2932.94

2.17

.049

Error

208187.67

154

1351.87

Total

347474.00

168

Corrected Total

232549.98

167

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Note. N = 168. F and P rounded to three decimal places, all other figures rounded to two decimal places.

Referencing Table 4.10, there was no significant difference in Part 121
arrival delays into MCO on days in which an orbital space launch occurred at Cape
Canaveral, compared to days that no launch occurred F(1, 154) = .468, p = .495.
Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for main effect one (launch). There was
also no significant difference in Part 121 arrival delays into MCO across the
category of day of week, F(6, 154) = .756, p = .606. Thus, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis for main effect two (day of week). There was a significant interaction
effect found between the main effect of launch and the main effect of day of week,
F(6, 154) = 2.17, p < .05. Thus, we can reject the interaction null hypothesis; there
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was a significant difference in Part 121 arrival delays into MCO on days that an
orbital space launch occurred from Cape Canaveral compared to days that no such
launch occurred, with respect to day of week.
Post Hoc
Effect size was calculated using the partial eta squared for each main effect
as well as the interaction. For the launch main effect, an effect size of η2 = .003
was found, for the day of week main effect, an effect size of η2 = 0.023 was found,
and the interaction effect yielded an effect size of η2 = 0.078. Thus, .3% of the
variance in arrival delays is being explained by launch or no launch, 2.3% of the
variance in arrival delays is being explained by day of week, and 7.8% of the
variance in arrival delays is being explained by the interaction of launch and day of
week.
Pairwise comparisons were conducted in which only a single pair showed a
significant difference; that of the Friday, launch versus no launch pair, which was
significant at p = .004. The full results of the post hoc pairwise comparisons for
RQ2 are listed as Appendix D.
Confidence interval data and standard errors were generated for both main
effects and the interaction effect. All standard error and confidence interval
information is included as Appendix E. An overall test power of 1−β = .110 was
computed, an objectively low power.
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Given that RQ2 found a significant interaction effect, an interaction plot
was produced and is illustrated below in Figure 4.7.

RQ2 Interaction Plot
60
50
40
30

20
10
0

Launch

No Launch

Monday

Tuesday

Wednesday

Friday

Saturday

Sunday

Thursday

Figure 4.7. RQ2 Interaction Plot
Referencing Figure 4.7, there is no interaction between Saturday and
Wednesday, with respect to launch. Sunday has a disordinal interaction with all
days, while Friday has a disordinal interaction with all days except Saturday, with
which it has ordinal interaction, with respect to launch. Wednesday has a disordinal
interaction with Thursday with respect to launch. The strongest disordinal
interaction present is between Friday and Sunday, with respect to launch. Finally,
there are additional ordinal interactions between the following pairs: Thursday and
Monday, Thursday and Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday, and Monday and
Wednesday. An interpretation of the most visually significant disordinal interaction
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(Friday and Sunday) would yield that on Fridays in which a launch occurred, the
average arrival delay was much higher than Fridays in which no launch occurred.
However, on Sundays that a launch occurred the average arrival delay was much
lower compared to Sundays that no launch occurred.
RQ3
RQ3 was inferentially evaluated using the two-way ANOVA hypothesis
test. Due to the selection of the ANOVA, the appropriate test statistic is the F
statistic. Given the sample size of N = 168, an alpha value of a = .05, and the
number of groups of G = 12, the following degrees of freedom and critical values
are found: The main effect of launch had a degrees of freedom of df = (1, 156) and
therefore the critical value for the main effect of launch is found as Fcrit = 3.902.
The main effect of time of day had a degrees of freedom of df = (5, 156) and
therefore a critical value of Fcrit = 2.272. The interaction of launch with time of day
had a degrees of freedom of df = (5, 156) and therefore a critical value of Fcrit =
2.272.
Assumptions
The two-way ANOVA has three assumptions: independence, normality, and
equal variance. The independence assumption of the two-way ANOVA was
complied with automatically due to the sample for RQ3 being randomly selected.
In order to assess the normality of RQ3’s distribution a Q-Q plot was constructed;
this plot is depicted below as Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8. Q-Q Plot of RQ3 Sample Data
Referencing Figure 4.8, the sample distribution for RQ3 displays a
moderate violation of the normality assumption. However, given that RQ3 used a
robust sample size (N > 30), this violation is acceptable.
The equal variances assumption was tested for RQ3 via the Levene Test,
which yielded a value of p = .182. This value is greater than RQ3’s significance of
a = .05, therefore the equal variances assumption is complied with. Thus, any
significant differences between groups found by the ANOVA could not be due to
unequal variances between groups.
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Findings
Table 4.11
RQ3 ANOVA Summary

Source
Launch

Sum Of
Squares
873.15

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

1

873.15

.686

.409

Time of Day

13296.60

5

2659.32

2.089

.070

Interaction

9638.46

5

1927.69

1.514

.188

1273.01

Error

198589.64

156

Total

307673.00

168

Corrected Total

222397.85

167

Note. N = 168. F and P rounded to three decimal places, all other figures rounded to two decimal places.

Referencing Table 4.11, there was no significant difference in Part 121
arrival delays into MCO on days in which an orbital space launch occurred at Cape
Canaveral, compared to days that no launch occurred F(1, 156) = .69, p = .409.
Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for main effect one (launch). There was
also no significant difference in Part 121 arrival delays into MCO across the
category of time of day, F(6, 156) = 2.09, p = .070. Thus, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis for main effect two (time of day). There was no significant interaction
effect found between the main effect of launch and the main effect of time of day,
F(6, 156) = 1.51, p = .188. Thus, we cannot reject the interaction null hypothesis.
Post Hoc
Effect size was calculated using the partial eta squared for each main effect
as well as the interaction. For the launch main effect, an effect size of η2 = .004
was found, for the time of day main effect, an effect size of η2 = .063 was found,
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and the interaction effect yielded an effect size of η2 = .046 Thus, .04% of the
variance in arrival delays is being explained by launch or no launch, 6.3% of the
variance in arrival delays is being explained by time of day, and 4.6% of the
variance in arrival delays is being explained by the interaction of launch and time
of day.
Pairwise comparisons were not conducted for this RQ due to the lack of
significant findings within the ANOVA.
Confidence interval data and standard errors were generated for both main
effects and the interaction effect. All standard error and confidence interval
information is included within Appendix E. An overall test power of 1 − β = .83
was computed, an objectively high power.
Given that RQ3 found no significant interaction effect, an interaction plot
was not produced for this RQ.
Outlier Analysis
As a safeguard against the effects of extreme scores on the findings, outlier
analysis and screening was conducted using the Turkey’s Fences protocol, due to
the non-normal distributions of the sample data. Upon examination, the following
findings occurred:
RQ1: No significant changes to the findings occurred as a result of outlier
analysis.
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RQ2: Main effect one (launch versus no-launch) became significant (F =
4.74, p = .031). However, this result is the opposite of the findings between these
two groups that were made as the primary groups compared within RQ1, and the
groups compared as main effect one in RQ3. No other significant changes to the
findings of RQ2 occurred as a result of the outlier analysis process.
RQ3: Main effect two (time of day) became significant (F = 10.62, p < .01).
Although this is an interesting finding, it is not surprising that there was a
difference between average flight delays between the different times of the day. No
other significant changes to the findings of RQ3 occurred as a result of the outlier
analysis process.
Foreword on Chapter 5
Chapter 4 detailed the finer quantitative details regarding the statistical
findings of RQs 1, 2 and 3. Specifically, across RQ1 and RQ3, the study was
unable to reject any null hypotheses. For RQ2, the null hypothesis was able to be
rejected for the interaction effect, however, these results were disputable due to the
close proximity of both the F and p values to their respective critical cutoffs.
Neither the null hypothesis for RQ2 main effect one no main effect two could be
rejected by the study. Chapter 5, below, applies further inductive and deductive
analysis to draw conclusions applicable for industry practice and future academic
research.

97

Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations
Summary of Study
The primary goal of this study was to determine inferentially if there was a
statistically significant effect on Part 121 arrival delays into MCO being driven by
orbital space launch operations at nearby Cape Canaveral. Unique to this study was
the use of actual archival delay data; all previous studies on this subject (that could
be located during the literature review process) used either dummy variables,
models, or some combination of both to produce results. In this regard, the study at
hand has met its goal; analysis was conducted using recorded delays from archival
government sources, and it has been determined to a fair degree if there was/is a
statistically significant impact on Part 121 arrival delays into MCO from orbital
space launch operations at Cape Canaveral.
Summary of Findings
RQ1
The inferential analysis for RQ1 found no evidence of a significant
difference in average Part 121 arrival delays into MCO between days that an orbital
space launch occurred from Cape Canaveral, and days that no launch occurred.
Repeated analysis with outliers removed yielded identical findings. Although not
found to be statistically significant, the average delay on launch days was actually
slightly lower than the average delay on non-launch days. Anecdotally, as the
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entirety of the data is examined, this difference increases over the established time
scale of the study by several minutes; further disputing the primary research
hypothesis of this study. Descriptively, the days in which orbital space launches
occurred experienced a higher frequency of delayed flights (69.76 delays per
average launch day) compared to those days that no space launch occurred (67.82
delays per average non-launch day). However, this frequency data is inconclusive
at best; if said data were more formally examined and controlled for factors such as
frequency of total arrivals into MCO during days of the week (perhaps by being
expressed as ratios of said arrivals), it is possible that this difference in frequencies
would fade and disappear. However, it is important to note that the majority of the
launch days in the sample data did not occur on what are shown in Table 4.2 to be
the busiest days (defined by total arrivals per day) of the week at MCO. This fact is
interesting enough to warrant follow-up study but is beyond the scope of the
current study to examine inferentially.
RQ2
RQ2 found no significant differences in arrival delays into MCO across its
two main factors of launch, and day of week. However, RQ2 did identify a
significant interaction effect between the two factors. Upon further inspection of
these findings, the critical value for the two-way ANOVA conducted under RQ2
was Fcrit = 2.158 and the critical alpha was a = .05. The results of the two-way
ANOVA found that the interaction had an F-value of F = 2.170 and a significance
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of p = .049. These findings are extremely close to the cutoff scores for both the
hypothesis test and the acceptable significance, and the resulting very low power
that was calculated post hoc does not help make the case that this interaction is
truly significant in a practical sense. Further post hoc examination of the interaction
plot does seem to indicate some strong disordinal interactions between some
factors, however, these are not uniform in nature, and therefore hint at a more
complex relationship amongst the factors. When screened for outliers, RQ2’s first
main effect (launch versus no launch) became significant, however, this finding is
opposite to the results of RQ1, and RQ3 main effect one, both of which compared
the same groups.
RQ3
RQ3 found no significant differences across its main effects of launch, and
time of day. RQ3 also found no significant interaction to be present between these
main effects. When screened for outliers, main effect two (time of day) became
significant. However, the confirmation that there is a difference in average flight
delays depending on the time of day (with no interaction occurring from space
launches) is not of major interest to this study. Post hoc examination revealed very
little by way of additional interesting findings, and the computed overall post hoc
power of 1−β > .80 indicates that the findings of this test are likely practically
accurate.
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Conclusions
In light of the statistical evidence produced by Chapter 4 that disputes the
original primary research hypothesis of this study, it is the overall conclusion of
this study that there is currently no significant practical effect from orbital space
launch operations at Cape Canaveral on Part 121 arrival delays into MCO.
Although there are some descriptive differences in the frequencies of
delayed flights between launch and non-launch days, these figures are still not
different enough to be of practical significance; even if found significant
inferentially, a difference of 1.94 average additional delays per launch day (as
descriptively found under RQ1) is not of practical significance given that MCO is
averaging over 400 Part 121 arrivals per day at present time. That figure would
notionally represent an increase of less than .5% arriving flights on an average
launch day. However, this fact itself is anecdotal because that finding was not
supported via inferential analysis. Of the various inferential tests that were
conducted under the three statistical research questions, only the interaction effect
of RQ2 yielded a statistically significant result, however, that finding was barley
acceptable in terms of cutoff scores (F and p) and had an unacceptably low power.
Therefore that singular finding can be disputed, given that all other inferential tests
that were conducted found the opposite.
Visual inspection of the interaction plot generated by RQ2, as well as the
various group means under all three RQs shows that there is no singular direction
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to whether delays on a specific day of week or time of day are affected by the
presence of an orbital space launch. It is easily inferable that if in fact, orbital space
launches were having a practical effect on MCO arrival delays, there should have
been a consistent direction observed within the various hypothesis tests, however,
there was not. On some days of the week, the average delay increases when an
orbital space launch occurs, and on others, it decreases (sometimes drastically). The
same can be said for the various times of day observed by this study. Further, the
effect of launch versus no launch was technically tested three separate times, under
three separate random samples, within this study (launch versus no launch was the
singular independent variable for RQ1, and a main effect for RQ2 and RQ3). Under
all three independent examinations, no significant effect was found in this factor.
The only conclusion that can be made from this information is that the
aforementioned asymmetric variances in delay times across differing days and time
periods are not due to orbital space launches but rather a plethora of external
factors. Thus, the primary conclusion of this study is that at this time, orbital space
launch operations at Cape Canaveral have no practical or statistically significant
effect on Part 121 arrival delays into MCO.
Implications
Implications to Prior Research
The literature review section of this study firmly established that the general
consensus surrounding the relationship between space launch operations and NAS
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delays is both frictive, and negative. Conversely, this study’s findings indicate quite
the opposite; while the relationship may indeed feel frictive at times, the practical
implications of said friction are simply not measurable in any statistical sense.
Indeed, the factors that are being interpreted as evidence of friction, such as launch
complex application processes with the FAA, activation of TFRs, or
implementation of other airspace systems, may in fact simply be tangentially
related phenomenon that are not currently resulting in a practical problem such as
arrival delays at airports outlaying spaceports. Further, this study’s findings lend
evidence to the claim that such systems are fully buffering orbital space traffic and
NAS traffic from delaying each other at present.
SpaceX Starship Program Licensing
Although the established research hypothesis of the study was not proven,
these findings still have implications for the American commercial space launch
industry. It was earlier pointed out in Chapter 4 that SpaceX is currently
responsible for the vast majority of launches occurring from Cape Canaveral, and it
is their stated desire to increase this presence as defined by both rate of launches
and scale of said launches. At present, the next generation Starship program, which
SpaceX has designed with the purpose of interplanetary transport, is being held
from progressing as the FAA conducts a lengthy environmental impact assessment
on the program (Federal Aviation Administration, 2022). This impact is not only
aimed at the environmental impact of the program on natural ecosystems, but also
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on external system and safety factors such as NAS impact (2022). The findings of
this study fully support SpaceX’s position that their operations are not (at present)
negatively impacting NAS operations in any meaningful manner.
Growth of Cape Canaveral and MCO
A secondary implication of this study’s findings are that there is excess
airspace capacity in the common areas between MCO and Cape Canaveral. Thus, it
is advisable that continued increases in both orbital traffic in and outbound to Cape
Canaveral and Part 121 traffic in and outbound to MCO would be of benefit to their
respective parties. However, it is still likely inevitable that one day there will be an
airspace conflict of practical significance between the two parties, and therefore it
is advisable that this relationship continue to be studied as time permits.
Generalizability
Population Generalizability
Given the random sampling methodology that was used to collect the
samples for each respective RQ, it is probable that all three RQs contained
representative samples. Therefore, it is probable that the results of this study have a
high degree of population generalizability.
Ecological Generalizability
The degree of ecological generalizability of this study’s findings would
likely depend on what factor was varied. For example, if the study’s setting was
changed from central Florida to the Denver Colorado or southeastern Texas
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regions, it is extremely likely that said study would have the same or very similar
findings. Likewise, if the dependent variable was changed from arrival delays to
departure delays, or perhaps both, it is also likely that this study’s findings would
prove similar to those of the follow-on study.
Limitations and Delimitations
Limitations
1.

Missing or Incomplete Archival Data. Any data that is missing, omitted, or
otherwise has been lost was not subject to my control. The use of official
U.S. government data sources, and data triangulation, minimized the study’s
exposure to this limitation.

2.

Airline Reporting Practices. This study assumed that all U.S. Department
of Transportation reporting requirements were properly met by all Part 121
air carriers from which delay data is to be drawn. Likewise, if any
individual air carrier employees responsible for reporting said figures
misunderstood a reporting requirement, misidentified a reportable event, or
simply caused a human error in their reporting, that was beyond the
researcher’s control.

3. Real-time air carrier actions taken to mitigate delays. It is possible that as
orbital launch-related Part 121 re-routes and delays begin to take place
across the Florida peninsula that individual air carriers took action to
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minimize or mitigate the effects of such delay actions. This possibility was
beyond the researcher’s ability to control.
4. Skill of individual air traffic controllers during reroutes. Once orbital
launch activities being at Cape Canaveral, ATC re-routes are required for
Part 121 traffic arriving into MCO. Many of these re-routings are manually
conducted by air traffic controllers, and therefore, the individual differences
in aptitude for this task between controllers could cause an asymmetric
influence in the actual arrival delay figures from different days and time
periods. This was beyond the researcher’s capability to control.
5. Time length of orbital launch windows. The time length for which an orbital
launch window is approved for can vary from instantaneous, to several
hours in duration. The variance in time length of each launch window was
beyond the researcher’s ability to control.
6. Effects of Covid-19 on Air Travel. The ebbs and flows in Part 121 flights
that have fluctuated following the March 2020 outbreak of Covid-19 were
not within the control of the researcher.
Delimitations
1.

Decision to utilize selected archival data sources. The research questions
presented by this study were best addressed using ex post facto analysis,
and therefore existing data a necessity. Appropriate U.S. government
archives were selected for use in this study due to the high probability that
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their contained data would have a high degree of integrity. The selection of
these data archives helped to maximize the population generalizability of
the study’s results.
2.

Decision to examine MCO arrivals rather than arrivals and departures. In
order to properly measure the issue of orbital launch delays on Part 121
traffic, the scope of study had to be narrow enough to allow for precise
results. Further, literature tells us that there is a spherical relationship
present between Part 121 arrival and departure delays that would affect the
accuracy of any results of a test that used both metrics as dependent
variables. This concept was expanded upon above, in Chapter 2. Although
outside of the scope of this study, this topic could make for an interesting
subject of follow-on research.

3. Decision to examine MCO and not Miami International (MIA) or other
south Florida airports. MCO was selected as the subject airport for this
study due to its closer proximity to Cape Canaveral’s range safety areas
compared to MIA and other south Florida airports. It was considered that a
comparison could be made between delay impacts at MCO and those at
MIA, however, after review, it was determined that this concept is outside
the scope of this project and better left for future academic research. It could
also be argued that the significantly smaller Melbourne Airport (MLB) is
more geographically closer to Cape Canaveral and may therefore suffer
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from a more significant Part 121 delay impact due to this fact. While this
could be true, due to the very limited amount of daily Part 121 arrivals into
MLB, that hypothesis would be nearly impossible to evaluate statistically at
this time due to both the small available sample of MLB’s 121 arrivals and
likewise the resultant low power of any findings. The ecological
generalizability of the results may be affected by this to some degree,
however, the use of a single location for study controlled for the potential
effects of a location threat to internal validity.
4. Decision not to use pre-COVID-19 Part 121 archival data. This study was
focused on producing a slot-assignment model that will be practically useful
to future generations of professionals, as well as the current one. The
depression in Part 121 flying caused by Covid-19 was temporary, and in the
previous twelve months the rate of orbital space launches occurring from
Cape Canaveral has been exponentially increasing. Therefore, it was ideal
to collect data from the most recently-available archival records.
5. Decision to use the one-way ANOVA rather than independent-means t-test
in RQ1. As explained in Chapter 3, this study was already going to be
checking the data for compliance with the assumptions of the ANOVA for
addressing RQ2 and RQ3. Therefore, it was simpler to also use the
ANOVA to address RQ1, given that the one-way ANOVA theoretically
produced identical results to the independent-means t-test in the context of
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this study. This should not have affected the generalizability of the study’s
results.
6. Decision to exclude delays coded due to weather from sample data. As
detailed in Chapters 2 and 3, each Part 121 delay analyzed by this study was
coded by the Department of Transportation by delay cause. Given that
MCO is located in central Florida and therefore is prone to tropical weather
patterns, no delays that were coded as due to weather were used as sample
data in this study. This action prevented the possible effects of weather as a
confounding variable on the study’s findings.
Recommendations for Industry Practice
Preventing Future Delay Impacts and Slot Assignment
The secondary objective of this study was to identify the ideal launch slot
assignment sequence to allow for minimal delay impact to NAS traffic. The initial
plan to construct this model was based on an outcome that confirmed the overall
research hypothesis of this study. In that case, a simple ordering of days and time
period from lowest to highest average delay would have sufficed. However, in light
of both the actual results of the study, and ancillary findings such as frequency data
that should be considered, this effort becomes slightly more complicated.
When constructing this slot assignment model, there are actually two inputs
identified within this study that must be considered to create a proper sequence:
average delay in minutes per category and average number of delays in that
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category. If we start by ordering the various categories of day and time during
launch days by average delay length, we generate the following sequences:
Day: Sunday, Saturday, Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, Wednesday and
Friday.
Time: Period 3, Period 4, Period 5, Period 2, Period 1, and Period 6.
In order to properly account for the impact of frequency data, the average
delay on launch days can be multiplied by the average frequency of delay, which
yields the average total minutes of delay per category. If this metric is applied, the
following superior sequence is generated:
Day: Tuesday, Sunday, Thursday, Saturday, Friday, Wednesday and
Monday.
Time: Period 2, Period 3, Period 1, Period 4, Period 5 and Period 6.
When compared to the figures presented in Chapter 4 regarding total
number of flights by category, it is clear that this output is not simply an artifact of
seeing lower delays due to lower volumes of arrivals in a given category. Thus, the
ideal starting point (defined as minimal average delay-minutes per category) in
terms of day to conduct an orbital space launch from Cape Canaveral would be
Tuesday, and the optimal time period would be 0400-0759. If we compare this to
the independent variable mode data from Chapter 4, the present day of week that
sees the most launches is a tie between Sunday and Wednesday, and time period 2
(0400-0759) is actually the least-utilized time period for launches.
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In summary, as both orbital launch and arrival rates in the central Florida
region continue to grow over the coming years, it would be wise to adopt a launch
slot sequence model that minimizes delay impact to both modes of transportation.
Doing so in a proactive manner could prevent any serious delays from occurring for
years to come due to the increased operational efficiency between the two modes of
transportation. In situations where multiple launch solutions are calculated for a
given launch (a common feature of pre-launch planning) it would be wise to opt for
windows that follow the corrected flow models above by day and time, as possible.
Recommendations for Future Research
Closer Analysis of Frequency Data
Given the findings of this study it is advisable that frequency data, in terms
of the number of flights delayed during orbital space launch events, be more
closely monitored and perhaps analyzed inferentially. If this study were quasireplicated, with the dependent variable being changed from average delay in
minutes to average frequency of flight delays or proportion of flights delayed, the
Chi Square could be used as the primary inferential tool in such an analysis. It
would be of interest to the academic community to see if the findings of such a
study match the findings of the present study or differ in some way.
Repeated Diagnostic Observations on a Fixed Timescale
With both Part 121 arrivals into MCO and orbital space launches from Cape
Canaveral expected to grow over the years to come, it is possible that an airspace
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delay conflict between the two transportation modes is only a matter of time. In
order to continually assess any potential delay impact between the two modes of
transportation, this study could be replicated and repeated on a fixed time interval,
such as every five years. Thus, the overall design of this study would function as a
diagnostic tool, alerting the academic community to the perhaps inevitable
eventuality that a practically significant delay conflict between orbital space launch
operations and Part 121 arrivals begins.
Conclusion
There is at present no delay impact of statistical or practical significance on
MCO from orbital space launch operations at Cape Canaveral that could be
detected by the study at hand. The majority opinion of the literature on this subject
leans into the idea that the central Florida segments of the NAS are on the precipice
of disaster due to the effects of space launch operations, however, this is simply not
true at the present time. It is beneficial to both the academic community and the
aerospace industry as a whole that actual data has now been measured and analyzed
rather than simply speculated using some manner of model. Even in light of these
findings, there is one consideration that must be heeded by future generations:
While the findings of the current study will certainly stand for a time, in the rapidly
changing environments of both Part 121 aviation and orbital space launch
operations, it would be wise to monitor this issue on a regular basis.
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Appendix A
A-Priori Sample Size Computations
Research Question 1
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Research Question 2
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Research Question 3
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Appendix B
Assumptions of the One-Way ANOVA and Factorial ANOVA
Table B.1
Levene Test Results

1

Levene
.066

2

1.026

.430

3

1.391

.182

RQ

Sig.
.798

Note. All figures rounded to three decimal places.
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Appendix C
Delay Removals by Category and Month
Table C.1
Sample Data Deletes

Sep 20

Weather
5

Oct 20

9

15

4

100

1155

Nov 20

13

34

1

115

1550

Dec 20

17

73

6

242

2359

Jan 21

21

48

3

195

1665

Feb 21

40

257

3

242

2317

Mar 21

24

72

4

392

2781

Apr 21

36

215

6

555

2815

May 21

30

51

12

567

2925

Jun 21

129

386

22

1173

4428

Total

324

1195

63

3659

22783

Month

No A-0
44

Security
2

Late Aircraft
78

Total Measured Delays
788

Note. Total Measured Delays indicates the remaining number of acceptable delays used by the study.
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Appendix D
RQ2 Post Hoc Pairwise Comparisons
Table D.1
RQ2 Post Hoc Pairwise Comparisons

Monday

Factor 1
Launch

Factor 2 Mean Dif.
No Launch
-3.83

SE
15.01

Sig.
.80

Lower
-33.49

Tuesday

Launch

No Launch

1.33

15.01

.93

-28.32

30.99

Wednesday

Launch

No Launch

9.33

15.01

.54

-20.92

38.99

Thursday

Launch

No Launch

-7.42

15.01

.62

-37.07

22.24

Launch

No Launch

44.33

15.01

.004

14.68

73.99

Saturday

Launch

No Launch

11.42

15.01

.45

-18.24

41.07

Sunday

Launch

No Launch

-28.00

15.01

.06

-57.65

1.65

Day

Friday

a

Upper
25.82

Note. All figures rounded to two decimal places except the significance level of Friday. Lower and Upper
signify the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval for the difference, respectivly. All figures
are in minutes.
a. Significant pair.
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Appendix E
Standard Error and Confidence Interval Data
RQ2
Table E.1
RQ2 Main Effect One

Variable

Mean

SE

Lower

Upper

Launch

24.214

4.012

16.289

32.139

No Launch

28.095

4.012

20.170

36.020

Note. Lower and Upper represernt the lower and upper bounds of a 95%
confidence interval, respectivley. All figures rounded to three decimal places.

Table E.2
RQ2 Main Effect 2

Day

Mean

SE

Upper

Lower

Monday

23.833

7.505

9.007

38.660

Tuesday

21.250

7.505

6.424

36.076

Wednesday

31.583

7.505

16.757

46.410

Thursday

26.792

7.505

11.965

41.618

Friday

32.583

7.505

17.757

47.410

Saturday

15.125

7.505

.299

29.951

Sunday

31.917

7.505

17.090

46.743

Note. Lower and Upper represernt the lower and upper bounds of a 95%
confidence interval, respectivley. All figures rounded to three decimal places.

125

Table E.3
RQ2 Interaction

Launch
No Launch

Launch

Day

Mean

SE

Upper

Monday

25.750

10.614

4.782

46.718

Tuesday

20.583

10.614

-.384

41.551

Wednesday

26.917

10.614

5.949

47.884

Thursday

30.500

10.614

9.532

51.468

Friday

10.417

10.614

-10.551

31.384

Saturday

9.417

10.614

-11.551

30.384

Sunday

45.917

10.614

24.949

66.884

Monday

21.917

10.614

.949

42.884

Tuesday

21.917

10.614

.949

42.884

Wednesday

36.250

10.614

15.282

57.218

Thursday

23.083

10.614

2.116

44.051

Friday

54.750

10.614

33.782

75.718

Saturday

20.833

10.614

-.134

41.801

Sunday

17.917

10.614

-3.051

38.884

Note. Lower and Upper represernt the lower and upper bounds of a 95%
confidence interval, respectivley. All figures rounded to three decimal places.
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Lower

RQ3
Table E.4
RQ3 Main Effect One

Variable

Mean

SE

Lower

Upper

Launch

24.810

3.893

17.120

32.499

No Launch

20.250

3.893

12.560

27.940

Note. Lower and Upper represernt the lower and upper bounds of a 95%
confidence interval, respectivley. All figures rounded to three decimal places.

Table E.5
RQ3 Main Effect 2

Time Period

Mean

SE

Upper

Lower

1

38.321

6.743

25.003

51.640

2

16.536

6.743

3.217

29.855

3

15.250

6.743

1.931

28.569

4

12.250

6.743

-1.069

25.569

5

25.786

6.743

12.467

39.105

6

27.036

6.743

13.717

40.355

Note. Lower and Upper represernt the lower and upper bounds of a 95%
confidence interval, respectivley. All figures rounded to three decimal places.
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Table E.6
RQ3 Interaction

Launch
No Launch

Launch

Time
Period
1

Upper

Lower

43.714

9.536

24.879

62.550

2

16.071

9.536

-2.764

34.907

3

21.286

9.536

2.450

40.121

4

14.500

9.536

-4.336

33.336

5

38.357

9.536

19.521

57.193

6

14.929

9.536

-3.907

33.764

1

32.929

9.536

14.093

51.764

2

17.000

9.536

-1.836

35.836

3

9.214

9.536

-9.621

28.050

4

10.000

9.536

-8.836

28.836

5

13.214

9.536

-5.621

32.050

6

39.143

9.536

20.307

57.979

Mean

SE

Note. Lower and Upper represernt the lower and upper bounds of a 95%
confidence interval, respectivley. All figures rounded to three decimal places.
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